Costruire relazioni tra l’Europa e una Cina in ascesa
Tesi Peter Mandelson, commissario UE al Commercio, GB:
necessaria politica unitaria UE con Cina; vie nazionali sono perdenti. Rapporto con Cina sarà un motore dell’integrazione europea
Ascesa Cina sarà la questione strategica più importante dei prossimi 5 anni.
Il mondo non ha mai visto una crescita su questa scala. Cina è secondo partner commerciale di UE dopo USA. In 15 anni suo export è cresciuto di 8 volte, superando il Jap.
E’ il maggior consumatore mondiale di carbone e di acciaio, rame e cemento. Intorno al 2030 Cina potrebbe avere più auto del resto del mondo [?]
Cercare di coinvolgere e influenzare la Cina, integrarla nel sistema int’le, non vederla come una minaccia.
Importanti anche i rapporti Cina/USA e Cina/PVS (spiazzamento del loro export da parte dei prodotti cinesi).
Necessaria strategia onnicomprensiva UE verso la Cina.
Building Europe’s Relations With A Rising China
By PETER MANDELSON
December 8, 2004
The 7th European Union/China Summit will take place in The Hague today. As incoming EU Trade Commissioner I have many immediate priorities, above all to push forward the global trade talks in the Doha Development Agenda. But it is already clear to me that there will be no more important strategic issue for us to manage over the next five years than the continuing rise of China’s economic power. It has huge implications for Europe and the rest of the world.
The world has never before seen growth on this scale. China is now Europe’s second largest trading partner after the U.S. In just the last 15 years its exports have doubled, then doubled again, and then doubled once more. Last year they overtook Japan’s.
China is the world’s largest burner of coal and largest consumer of steel, copper and cement. Chinese demand for oil has been a major factor in the rise of world oil prices. By 2030 China may emit as much carbon dioxide as the U.S., and have more cars than the rest of the world.
These phenomena will have far reaching economic, political and social impact for all of us. They imply political choices for China and for the rest of the world.
We would be foolish to try to resist them or to go into denial. The new China is a fact. Our aim should be to engage and influence, not to see China as a strategic threat. Seeing China as a threat is more likely at some point to make it one.
Our aim should be integrating China into the international system more fully. China’s accession to the World Trade Organization was an important step forward. And it worked. The WTO system has not broken as some predicted, and membership has helped advance necessary economic reform in China.
But the success of the WTO now depends also on leadership from China — by fully implementing its WTO commitments and making proposals in the Doha Round which reflect an overarching support for the global trading system. And China’s new responsibilities go much further. For example, China can contribute more to collective international activity in peacekeeping and conflict prevention.
We need to think through carefully and systematically these implications of China’s growing power. It will change politics in the Asian region and affect China’s relationship with Japan.
The China/U.S. relationship will be a central factor in international relations in this new century. A key question for all of us is whether they will be able to manage tensions as they arise. There is much potential for miscalculation. The implications of the economic links between the two also need to be better understood.
The implications of China’s growth for other developing countries are particularly stark. We are already seeing this as the removal of textile quotas comes into effect. European textile manufacturers are feeling the pressure. But the implications for people in countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan are far more dramatic.
Europe must pursue policies to help these countries to adapt to inevitable change. But China, too, like other advanced developing countries, will need to take much more responsibility for assisting this adjustment. China should play a stronger role in supporting an international system in which it has a growing stake. It is no good eliminating poverty in China if the consequence is to transfer it elsewhere.
And what does this mean for Europe? We need a collective and united response. Europe will be infinitely more persuasive in relations with China if we establish a clear collective strategy than if individual nations pursue narrowly defined national interests. I believe our need to engage with China will be a driver for European integration in the future. It is an example of why those who believe that individual European countries will be able to protect their interests outside the Union are misguided.
The EU needs to engage with China on a wide economic agenda, encouraging transparency and good economic governance, promoting effective regulation, encouraging two-way investment. There are huge prizes to be won in the Chinese economy. In bilateral trade, the time has come to make further progress on investment liberalization, opening our government procurement markets to each other, and better enforcement of intellectual-property rights.
All this needs a structure. The present framework for EU/China relations is 20 years old and no longer adequate. We should consider whether we need to overhaul this framework to bring together political, economic, environmental, social and other aspects of policy into a single overarching strategic approach.
This is a vast agenda. I hope to help the EU rise to the challenge.
Mr. Mandelson is the EU’s trade commissioner.