I vincitori islamisti in Egitto tentano un cambiamento con Hamas
– I Fratelli Musulmani, vincitori delle elezioni in Egitto, hanno bisogno di stabilità nella regione per gestire la transizione politica interna.
– Abbandonando la linea di sostegno incondizionato a Hamas (nata 25 anni fa’ dalla Fratellanza musulmana, e che ora ha il controllo di Gaza) contro Fatah (che controlla la West Bank), la Fratellanza musulmana si pone in funzione di mediatrice tra le due fazioni palestinesi, perché raggiungano un compromesso.
– Se la scommessa della Fratellanza di fare cooperare le due fazioni con l’Egitto divenuto più assertivo avesse successo, aumenterebbe la capacità di contrattazione verso Israele.
– Questa nuova linea della Fratellanza potrebbe alleggerire la posizione degli Usa nella regione, ma innervosisce Israele, che finora ha rifiutato di negoziare con un governo palestinese comprendente Hamas.
– I leader della Fratellanza egiziana hanno dichiarato di riconoscere l’accordo di Camp David Egitto-Isreale del 1979.
o La salita al potere in Egitto della Fratellanza ha aperto un dibattito in Hamas, con una parte contraria all’accordo con Fatah, per sfruttare la nuova posizione di vantaggio derivante dalla Fratellanza egiziana.
o Hamas si è già detta disposta a riconoscere i confini dello Stato palestinese con Israele precedenti alla guerra del 1967, a patto che venga riconosciuta la piena sovranità del nuovo Stato. In Israele, che respinge i confini del 1967, c’è chi pone attenzione ai cambiamenti in atto.
o Hamas ha accettato (nei recenti negoziati di Doha) che il capo di Fatah, Abbas, presieda per i primi sei mesi un governo di unità per i territori palestinesi fino a nuove elezioni.
– La rivoluzione momento di ispirazione per attori internazionali a porsi come alleati (dichiarazioni dell’ambasciata Usa al Cairo.
– Il Consiglio Supremo delle Forze Armate al governo in Egitto ha accettato i crediti FMI per $3,2MD,
o inizialmente respinti perché preferiva chiederne ai pesi del Golfo e ad altri paesi arabi, che però hanno posto condizioni politiche non accettate.
[Leggi aiuti-sussidi, prestiti=Investimenti politico-economici delle potenze, n.d.r]
– Altri finanziamenti da Banca Mondiale (BM) Banca Africana per lo Sviluppo, UE, Usa e Giappone dipendono dall’accettazione del prestito FMI, le cui condizioni sono soprattutto legate a crescita, inflazione e deficit del bilancio, oltre al “buon governo”.
– Nel maggio 2011 i paesi del G-8 hanno comunicato di voler sostenere Egitto, Tunisia e Lega Araba nella transizione seguente alla primavera araba; $20MD previsti per il 2013 per costruire la democrazia in Egitto e Tunisia, come prerequisito per buon governo, trasparenza, e per la crescita del settore privato.
– I prestiti previsti da organizzazioni internazionali e regionali circa $10,8MD, rappresentano la parte maggiore degli aiuti all’Egitto, il resto è in sussidi per programmi specifici, in genere inferiori all’1% del PIL egiziano.
– Le riserve internazionali nette dell’Egitto, sono calate di circa $2MD al mese, dai $35,6MD del 2011 a $16,4MD di fine gennaio 2012. Se la tendenza continua l’Egitto rischia di non riuscire a coprire più di 4 mesi di importazioni.
– A gennaio l’Egitto ha chiesto un prestito di $1MD alla BM, latri $500mn. alla Banca Africana per lo Sviluppo.
– Nel decennio 1998-2008 la UE ha dato $1,3MD di sussidi all’Egitto (scuola salute, acqua, energia, sviluppo, settore privato); dal 2008 circa €150mn l’anno; per il 2012 previsti altri €350mn.
– La UE dispone inoltre di un meccanismo chiamato “assistenza macrofinanziaria” utilizzabile in aggiunta al prestito FMI, ora è in discussione un prestito di €500mn a completamento di quello FMI.
– Il Giappone è tra i maggiori finanziatori dell’’Egitto, per dimensione e durata di sussidi per lo sviluppo e di prestiti: $460mn nel 2006 (per il Grand Egyptian Museum); altri $70mn per un nuovo aeroporto ad Alessandria e $175 per una centrale eolica nel Golfo di Suez;
o il debito complessivo dell’Egitto verso il Giappone sarebbe di circa $3MD (dati Agenzia giapponese per la cooperazione internazionale).
– USA, i finanziamenti annui abituali all’Egitto sono di $1,3 MD per il settore militare, $250mn per l’economia; nel maggio 2011 decisi altri $165 mn per la creazione di posti di lavoro, + sussidi di organizzazioni non governative per la democrazia.
– L’opposizione occidentale alla Fratellanza musulmana non è una questione di principio, ma è dettata dalle circostanze politiche;
o in presenza di condizioni adatte può di nuovo riproporsi una alleanza con essa, come la storia insegna.
– Ad es., negli anni Cinquanta, Occidente e Fratellanza cooperarono; un esperto di propaganda Usa, del governo Eisenhower, consigliava di puntare su un’alleanza con i musulmani devoti, in particolare con correnti come la Fratellanza musulmana, considerata affidabile come anti-comunista;
o nel meglio dubbio meglio cooperare con gli islamisti che con gli islamici moderati contro il socialismo reale.
o Al suo secondo mandato, Eisenhower era per far tutto il possibile per evidenziare l’aspetto della guerra santa contro le forze socialiste nei paesi islamisti in cui si fosse in competizione con Mosca. Citava positivamente il re saudita Ibn Saud per aver chiamato tutti gli arabi ad opporsi al comunismo.
o La cooperazione dell’Occidente con forze islamiste perdeva la propria funzione solo dove non avevano più peso le forze socialiste o filo-sovietiche, come quasi ovunque negli anni Novanta.
– Berlino ha reagito con preoccupazione alla vittoria elettorale del partito islamista egiziano Libertà e Giustizia, il braccio politico della Fratellanza musulmana, e alla sconfitta liberale del Blocco Egiziano, prevedendo la possibilità di un nuovo corso in politica estera, con l’avvicinamento a paesi come l’Iran, che vogliono impedire l’influenza dell’Occidente.
– Scriveva il periodico Internationale Politik (IP), importante strumento di consulenza del governo tedesco, che il nuovo governo egiziano sarebbe stato meno disponibile alla a cooperazione con l’Europa, e con Israele e maggiore collaborazione con Hamas.
o IP consigliava alla Ue, per non perdere influenza, di mostrare chiaramente al governo egiziano quale tipo di relazioni accetta e quale no;
o adeguandosi al consiglio, il ministro Esteri tedesco ebbe a dichiarare: per Berlino ci sono “linee rosse” che il Cairo deve rispettare (no alla violenza, sì a democrazia, stato di diritto, pluralismo, libertà; il governo tedesco da tempo sta trattando con attivisti della Fratellanza, pensiamo che rispettino le linee rosse …
– Al contempo Berlino ha pensato a come indebolire la Fratellanza, e rafforzare le forze liberali filo-occidentali; a questo dovrebbero servire gli interventi di influenti politici a piazza Tahrir; la sede del Goethe Institut del Cairo è stata aperta come punto di incontro per il circolo dei liberali.
– IP consigliava di cercare di togliere terreno alla Fratellanza al di fuori delle città tramite organizzazioni non governative che dovrebbero diffondere idee liberali e insegnare come organizzarsi politicamente.
o Dato che la Fratellanza rafforza la propria influenza con opere caritative occorre anche occuparsi degli interessi della popolazione contadina; la UE dovrebbe assicurarsi che almeno una parte degli aiuti economici europei destinati all’Egitto vengano utilizzati per fornire servizi (strutture educative, sociali, sanitarie) nelle regioni vicine alla Fratellanza.
– Per contenere le forze islamiste l’Occidente conta anche sui generali, rimasti uniti e potenti:
o i liberali, sostenuti da governi e media occidentali, o accettano l’agenda islamista, appoggiata dai militari o sono condannati all’irrilevanza.
o Faz: i realisti tra i Fratelli musulmani sanno che i militari rimangono un fattore di forza determinante; poco probabile che i generali, che hanno legami con l’Occidente, America in particolare, accettino per l’Egitto un orientamento politico quasi teocratico.
IP, sul movimento di protesta di piazza Tahrir: sorprendentemente basso il numero degli attivisti politici, perché provengono dai gruppi politici che utilizzano internet, e che rappresentano una percentuale molto limitata della popolazione.
March 24, 2012
Islamist Victors in Egypt Seeking Shift by Hamas
– CAIRO — As it prepares to take power in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood is overhauling its relations with the two main Palestinian factions in an effort to put new pressure on Israel for an independent Palestinian state.
– Officials of the Brotherhood, Egypt’s dominant Islamist movement, are pressing its militant Palestinian offshoot, Hamas, which controls Gaza, to make new compromises with Fatah, the Western-backed Palestinian leadership that has committed to peace with Israel and runs the West Bank.
– The intervention in the Palestinian issue is the clearest indication yet that as it moves into a position of authority, the Brotherhood, the largest vote getter in Egypt’s parliamentary elections, intends to both moderate its positions on foreign policy and reconfigure Egypt’s.
– Brotherhood officials say that they are pulling back from their previous embrace of Hamas and its commitment to armed struggle against Israel in order to open new channels of communications with Fatah, which the Brotherhood had previously denounced for collaborating with Israel and accused of selling out the Palestinian cause. Brotherhood leaders argue that if they persuade the Palestinians to work together with a newly assertive Egypt, they will have far more success forcing Israel to bargain in earnest over the terms of statehood.
– “Now we have to deal with the Palestinian parties as an umbrella for both of them, and we have to stand at an equal distance from each,” said Reda Fahmy, a Brotherhood leader who oversees its Palestinian relations and is now chairman of the Arab affairs committee in Egypt’s upper house of Parliament. “Any movement of the size of the Muslim Brotherhood, when it is in the opposition it is one thing and then when it comes to power it is something completely different.”
– The shift in the Brotherhood’s stance toward neutrality between Hamas and Fatah — acknowledged by officials of both groups — may relieve United States policy makers, who have long worried about the Brotherhood’s relationship with the more militant Hamas. The United States considers the Palestinian group to be a terrorist organization. But the shift in Egypt’s policies may unnerve Israel, because it is a move away from former President Hosni Mubarak’s exclusive support for the Western-backed Fatah movement and its commitment to the peace process. Israeli officials have said they will not negotiate with a Palestinian government that includes Hamas.
– But Mr. Fahmy said the Brotherhood believed that Palestinian unity could break the deadlock in talks with Israel. “A Palestinian negotiator will go the table and know that all the Palestinian people are supporting his project,” Mr. Fahmy said. “This will be a huge change and very important to both sides.” Jailed at times by the Mubarak government for his role in the Brotherhood, Mr. Fahmy spoke this month from an ornate hall of Parliament.
– After decades of denunciations and enmity — Brotherhood texts still sometimes refer to the Jewish state as “the Zionist entity” — Brotherhood leaders have said that as members of the governing party they will honor Egypt’s 1979 peace accord with Israel. Some of its leaders say they believe that such coexistence can become a model for Hamas as well, if Israel moves toward accepting a fully independent Palestinian state.
– He noted that Hamas had already made statements indicating that it would accept coexistence with Israel along its borders before the 1967 war. “It is true that it is like a person who is forced to drink poison or eat a dead animal, but they still made the statements,” he said, “so we support that, provided that this state within the ’67 borders is completely sovereign in air and in sea and in land.”
Already, Mr. Fahmy claimed, the Brotherhood’s new stance was making “a fundamental difference,” including jump-starting the stalled reconciliation talks between the two Palestinian groups.
– The Brotherhood’s supreme guide, Mohammed Badie — effectively its chairman — had personally told Hamas’s top political leader, Khaled Meshaal, to be “more flexible,” Mr. Fahmy said, and at recent talks in Doha, Qatar, Hamas had agreed for the first time to let Fatah’s leader, Mahmoud Abbas, preside over the first six months of a unity government for the Palestinian territories until new elections could be held.
“Hamas never would have accepted that Abbas heads the government,” Mr. Fahmy said, “but now they are.”
– Moussa Abu Marzook, a senior Hamas leader who has settled in Cairo after fleeing Damascus, said that the group was full of hope about the rise of the Brotherhood, from which Hamas originally sprang 25 years ago.
– His circumstances attested to those hopes. In 1995, he was arrested the United States, and spent two years fighting an Israeli extradition request and until recently was permitted to enter Egypt only under the watchful eye of its intelligence service. Now he spoke from the large and sunny salon of the second-floor office above his well-fortified suburban villa here. He acknowledged that the rise of its fellow Islamists in Egypt had set off a deep debate inside Hamas.
– Some argued against any compromise with Fatah, predicting that Hamas’s bargaining position would only grow stronger as its Islamist allies in Egypt took on new power. Fatah, on the other hand, had lost its primary regional sponsor, the government of Mr. Mubarak.
But Mr. Abu Marzook said that those who expected the new Egypt to back Hamas completely would be disappointed. “It’s normal that the Muslim Brotherhood will be more realistic than they used to be when they weren’t in power,” he said.
He said he favored more conciliations with Fatah. “Reaching reconciliation is in the best interest of the Palestinian people,” he said.
Fatah officials, for their part, say that so far they have been pleased with the Brotherhood’s neutral approach to both factions. “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is doing everything it can to end the Palestinian division,” said Saeb Erekat, Fatah’s chief negotiator.
Mr. Fahmy said that the Brotherhood still believed that United Nations resolutions still qualified Hamas’s armed struggle as a legitimate movement of resistance to an armed occupation. “The texts of all religions guarantee the right to self-defense,” he said.
– But he said that the Brotherhood’s support would never extend to supplying weapons. “Foolishness,” he said. “Turning the region into an arms market is not good for anyone. We are against the distribution of weapons anywhere or supporting such a movement, even if we are biased towards it in defending people’s rights. We are careful about the region’s stability.”
Fatah has gone much further than both Hamas and the Brotherhood in seeking peaceful coexistence with Israel. But Mr. Erekat suggested that the differences between the parties may not be as great now as they were in the past. “The Muslim Brothers are the majority party now in Egypt; they are the masters of themselves,” he said. “If they think it’s in the best interest of Egypt, let them abolish the Camp David treaty. But this isn’t what I heard.”
– Israel, for its part, rejects the 1967 borders as insufficiently defensible for its security.
– But some in Israel are watching the shifts. “Hamas is showing indications that it’s moving towards a more responsible position,” said Shlomo Brom, an analyst and retired brigadier general in the Israeli military. “But because of Hamas’s bloody history, it will be very difficult for the Israeli government to accept this reality. I don’t know how long it will take.”
Mr. Fahmy, though, predicted continued “tranquillity” between Hamas and Israel, in part because Hamas understands that the Brotherhood needs to stability to manage Egypt’s political transition.
“Hamas considers the Muslim Brotherhood a strategic extension of itself,” he said. “And I think that this in itself is a strong guarantee that the situation will not explode in the area.”
Loans to Egypt Hinge on Democracy Issues
– CAIRO — Inspired by the revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, the international community has offered Egypt billions of dollars in desperately needed financial aid, on the condition that the country bolsters democracy and the protection of human rights.
– After initially refusing a $3.2 billion line of credit offered by the International Monetary Fund, the ruling military council turned around last month and said it wanted the money.
– But negotiations with the I.M.F. are not yet a done deal. Renewed street violence ahead of the January parliamentary elections and the crackdown on pro-democracy groups since then, including the prosecution of U.S. citizens, have put a broad swathe of foreign aid at risk.
– In addition to the I.M.F loan, deals are in the works for low-interest loans from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union[e] and the U.S. and Japanese governments. But much of this additional financing is contingent on securing the I.M.F. loan, as well as on progress in areas like elections, free speech and the rule of law.
“Many of Egypt’s friends aren’t going to move until the I.M.F. loan is approved,” said Mohsin Khan, senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics and a former director of the Middle East and Central Asia department at the I.M.F. “And without it, Egypt is in big trouble. Every month the loan is delayed, Egypt’s needs for financing become that much larger.”
– The I.M.F. loan is still being analyzed in Washington. If the loan program is similar to the one Egypt originally rejected, Mr. Khan said, the fund will focus its lending conditions on macroeconomic issues like growth, inflation and the budget deficit. For many of Egypt’s other allies, however, good governance will be necessary to build on the I.M.F. loan’s foundation.
– Likening the Arab Spring to the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Group of 8 leading countries meeting in Deauville, France, last May announced a partnership with Egypt, Tunisia and the Arab League to assist their transitions to more democratic societies.
– Through various development banks, the participants have slated up to $20 billion through 2013 to support democracy-building efforts in Egypt and Tunisia, a prerequisite for improving governance, transparency, accountability — and growth in the private sector.
– E.U. policy on Egypt is that “if the government wants to do more, there will be more support and more cooperation available,” Marc Franco, a former E.U. ambassador to Egypt, said during an interview. He spoke in Cairo in January, a few days before retiring from diplomatic service.
“The same goes for the Deauville commitments,” Mr. Franco said. “To support this process of democratization of the regimes, the G-8 said it will make additional money available.”
“But of course the financial assistance supports political reform,” he said. “If the political reform stalls, the pipeline might dry up.”
– Egypt receives foreign aid in the form of grants for specific programs and loans that the International Cooperation Ministry can spend as it sees fit. Grants usually amount to less than 1 percent of Egypt’s gross domestic product, so the real money comes in loans.
– Existing loan programs from international and regional organizations amount to about $10.8 billion. This is money that Egypt desperately needs, since the revolution and post-revolutionary violence have destroyed tourism — a key source of foreign currency — and stalled much of the economy, including the energy industry and agriculture.
– According to the Central Bank of Egypt, the country’s net international reserves fell to $16.4 billion by the end of January from $35.6 billion at the beginning of 2011. If reserves continued to decline at the recent rate of close to $2 billion a month, Mr. Franco said, Egypt would be at risk of not being able to cover more than four months of imports.
– On Feb. 2, the World Bank said Egypt had requested a $1 billion loan, while in late January, International Cooperation Minister Fayza Abul Naga, a holdover from the Mubarak government in the transitional cabinet, said Egypt would ask for an additional $500 million from the African Development Bank.
– The European Union[e] spent €1 billion, or $1.3 billion, in grants to Egypt from 1998 to 2008, focusing on education, health, water, energy, trade and private-sector development. Since then it has slated about €150 million per year for similar programs; in response to the Arab Spring, Brussels has said could be willing to provide more funds to the region.
– “For 2012,” Mr. Franco said, “there is additional funding of around €350 million. How we allocate that to the various countries depends on how clear the governments’ objectives are and how clearly they can tell us what they want.”
– There is also an E.U. mechanism known as macrofinancial assistance that could be used to top up the I.M.F. loan if Egypt needs more. Mr. Franco declined to say how much the mechanism could provide, but called it “a substantial amount, provided the I.M.F. loan is signed and sealed.”
– Last week, Heliodoro Temprano-Arroyo, a senior official in the European Commission’s macrofinancial assistance unit, said at a round table meeting in Cairo that the Union[e] was considering a sum of €500 million to complement the I.M.F. loan.
– Japan is one of the largest and longest-term providers of development grants and loans to Egypt. Through the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo agreed in 2006 to lend Egypt $450 million to help build the Grand Egyptian Museum near the Giza Pyramids to house many of the country’s ancient artifacts. After various delays, construction of the museum began last month and the opening is planned for 2015.
– The cooperation agency has also lent the Egyptian government $70 million to build a new airport in Alexandria and $175 million for a wind farm on the Gulf of Suez. According to the agency’s latest figures, published at the end of 2010, Egypt’s outstanding debt to Japan was about $3 billion.
Nobuhiro Ikuro, head of the Japanese International Cooperation Agency in Egypt, said Japan could be willing to do more: “Our current policy is to assist this crucial transition period toward democracy,” he said late in January. “Democratization is very important for us, and it’s our intention to provide assistance now to help push forward this process.”
– Despite the international community’s eagerness to help, however, Egypt has run hot and cold. In the months following the revolution, the ruling Supreme Council of Armed Forces rejected several offers from abroad. The council appeared to be courting the Gulf states and other Arab countries, but when those countries tried to impose political conditions as part of their packages, the military council refused and reopened talks with the I.M.F. and other institutions.
– Egypt’s relationship with the United States is also growing more complicated. Like the European Union[e] and Japan, Washington said last month that it was eager to accelerate the pace of aid to Egypt. In addition to its usual funding — $1.3 billion in military aid and an additional $250 million in economic aid per year — the U.S. government last May set up a $165 million program for creating jobs and providing pro-democracy grants through nongovernment organizations.
– “The revolution was an incredibly inspiring moment that got players around the world very interested in trying to be good partners with the new spirit that was emerging,” said a high-ranking U.S. Embassy official in Cairo, who declined to be identified by name according to State Department policy. “Despite the adverse budget situation we’re living in, this enthusiasm was able to secure extra resources for Egypt and other countries in the region.”
– But all U.S. aid has been jeopardized by the Egyptian decision to try 43 pro-democracy workers, including at least 16 U.S. citizens, on charges of involvement in banned activities and illegally receiving foreign funds. After opening Sunday the trial was adjourned until April. On Tuesday, the three judges hearing the case resigned, plunging the outcome into greater uncertainty.
Rote Linien
– (Eigener Bericht) – Berliner Regierungsberater debattieren über Maßnahmen zur Schwächung der Muslimbruderschaft in Ägypten. In der ersten Runde der dortigen Parlamentswahl hat die Partei der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit, die als parteipolitischer Arm der Bruderschaft fungiert, einen deutlichen Sieg erzielt.
– Islamistische Parteien können insgesamt auf eine Zweidrittelmehrheit hoffen. Es sei damit zu rechnen, dass dies zu einer weniger am Westen orientierten Außenpolitik der Kairoer Regierung führe, heißt es unter Experten: "Der Aufstieg der Bruderschaft bedeutet, dass die kommende ägyptische Regierung weniger Bereitschaft zur Kooperation mit Europa zeigen wird." Die EU müsse "sicherstellen, dass der Aufstieg der Muslimbruderschaft ein kurzfristiges Phänomen bleibt und dass sie (…) eine Schädigung europäischer Interessen nicht duldet", fordert ein Experte in der Zeitschrift Internationale Politik, dem wichtigsten Medium des außenpolitischen Establishments in Berlin. Die aktuellen Spannungen zwischen der Muslimbruderschaft und dem Westen täuschen darüber hinweg, dass beide Seiten einst kooperierten – im Kalten Krieg gegen die realsozialistischen Staaten.
– Mit erheblicher Sorge reagiert Berlin auf den deutlichen Sieg islamistischer Parteien in der ersten Runde der Parlamentswahl in Ägypten. Nach Auszählung aller Stimmen in rund einem Drittel der ägyptischen Provinzen führt die Partei der Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit (Freedom and Justice Party, FJP) mit rund 37 Prozent. Sie steht der Muslimbruderschaft nahe. Auf Rang zwei kam die radikal-islamistische Nur-Partei; sie erreichte gut 24,5 Prozent.
– Abgeschlagen lag die liberale Ägyptische Allianz (Egyptian Bloc) mit gut 13 Prozent auf Rang drei. Die zweite sowie die dritte Wahlrunde folgen am 14. Dezember und am 3. Januar. Mit dem Sieg der Muslimbruderschaft war schon lange gerechnet worden. Sie sei "eine geschlossene politische Bewegung", die "auf beispiellose Weise in der Lage" sei, "ihre Anhänger zu mobilisieren", hieß es unlängst in einem Beitrag in der Zeitschrift Internationale Politik.
– Über die im Westen favorisierte liberale Protestbewegung vom Tahrir-Platz war dagegen zu lesen: "Die Zahl der politisch Aktiven bleibt erstaunlich niedrig, denn sie kommen aus der Gruppe politisch gebildeter Internetnutzer, deren Anteil an der ägyptischen Bevölkerung ohnehin schon sehr gering ist."[1]
Weniger kooperationsbereit
– Sorge weckt im Westen vor allem die Überlegung, die Muslimbruderschaft könne als stärkste Kraft in Kairo eine außenpolitische Neuorientierung erzwingen. "Der Aufstieg der Bruderschaft bedeutet, dass die kommende ägyptische Regierung weniger Bereitschaft zur Kooperation mit Europa zeigen wird", mutmaßt die Internationale Politik.
– Ägypten werde sich unter islamistischem Einfluss, heißt es weiter, womöglich denjenigen Staaten annähern, die – wie etwa Iran – "dem Einfluss des Westens einen Riegel vorschieben wollen".
– Auch die Bereitschaft zur Kooperation mit Israel werde sinken, die Zusammenarbeit mit der Hamas hingegen zunehmen. Um dem drohenden Einflussverlust schon jetzt vorzubeugen, müsse die EU "unmissverständlich aufzeigen, welche Verhaltensweisen sie akzeptiert und welche nicht".[2] Entsprechend hat der deutsche Außenminister unlängst erklärt, es gebe aus Sicht Berlins "rote Linien", die Kairo exakt beachten müsse: "auf Gewalt verzichten, sich zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat, Pluralismus sowie zum inneren und äußeren Frieden bekennen". Die Bundesregierung sei "auf Arbeitsebene" schon längst mit Aktivisten der Muslimbruderschaft im Gespräch, "von denen wir denken, dass sie die roten Linien beachten".[3]
Liberalismus als Kampfmittel
– Gleichzeitig werden in Berlin Möglichkeiten sondiert, die Muslimbruderschaft strategisch zu schwächen sowie den Einfluss prowestlich-liberaler Kräfte zu stärken.
o Die PR-wirksamen Auftritte hochrangiger deutscher Politiker auf dem Tahrir-Platz sowie die "Tahrir-Lounge", die in der Filiale des Goethe-Instituts in Kairo als ein Treffpunkt für liberale Zirkel eröffnet worden ist, sollen dazu beitragen.
o Für wichtiger halten es manche jedoch, den Islamisten außerhalb der Städte das Wasser abzugraben. "In vielen ländlichen Regionen hat die Bruderschaft fast ein Machtmonopol", heißt es in der Internationalen Politik: "Europa und die progressiven Gruppen in Ägypten können diesen Einfluss nur bekämpfen, wenn sie freiheitliche Ideen verbreiten und den Menschen beibringen, wie sie sich politisch organisieren können." Dies solle mit Hilfe von "Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen" geschehen.
o Da die Muslimbruderschaft ihren Einfluss stark mit karitativen Tätigkeiten zementiere, müsse man sich außerdem um die Belange der ländlichen Bevölkerung kümmern. Dazu könne die europäische "Wirtschaftshilfe" für Ägypten genutzt werden: Die EU müsse "sicherstellen, dass die Regierung zumindest Teile dieser Hilfe nutzt, um Dienstleistungen in jenen Regionen auszubauen, die von Bildungs-, Sozial- und medizinischen Einrichtungen bedient werden, die der Bruderschaft nahe stehen." Über die Ursache der westlichen Sorge um die ägyptische Landbevölkerung heißt es explizit: "Der ‘Parallelstaat’ der Organisation (der Muslimbruderschaft, d.Red.) muss abgebaut werden, um die Unterstützung für die Bruderschaft zu schmälern."[4]
– Dabei setzt der Westen bei seinem Versuch, die islamistischen Kräfte einzugrenzen, durchaus auch auf die Generäle. "Unter den drei breiten Machtblöcken in Ägypten – dem Militär, den Islamisten und den säkularen Demokraten – hat sich der letztere als der schwächste erwiesen", heißt es in einer US-Analyse.
– Das Militär hingegen bleibe "geeint und mächtig". Es sei "klar, dass die Fraktion, für welche die westlichen Regierungen und Medien eintreten" – also die Liberalen -, "nun entweder die islamistische Agenda akzeptieren, das Militär unterstützen oder in Irrelevanz verblassen muss".[5] Auch deutsche Pressekommentatoren urteilen, man könne sich gegen die Muslimbruderschaft auf die Streitkräfte verlassen. "Die Realisten unter den Muslimbrüdern werden wissen, dass das Militär immer noch ein entscheidender Machtfaktor in Ägypten ist", heißt es beispielsweise: Es sei "wenig wahrscheinlich, dass die Generäle, die enge Verbindungen zur westlichen Welt, insbesondere nach Amerika, unterhalten, mit einer quasi-theokratischen Ausrichtung der ägyptischen Politik einverstanden wären."[6]
– Die aktuellen Spannungen zwischen dem Westen und der Muslimbruderschaft täuschen darüber hinweg, dass beide Seiten in der Vergangenheit durchaus eng miteinander kooperierten. Dies war etwa in den 1950er Jahren der Fall.
– Damals forderte ein Propagandaspezialist aus der Regierung von US-Präsident Dwight D. Eisenhower, man müsse im globalen Systemkampf auf ein Bündnis mit frommen Muslimen setzen – insbesondere mit Strömungen wie etwa der damals erstarkenden Muslimbruderschaft, die als zuverlässig antikommunistisch galt.
– Eisenhower war während seiner zweiten Amtszeit sogar der Ansicht, man solle in islamisch geprägten Ländern, in denen man mit Moskau rivalisiere, "alles tun, um den Aspekt des ‘Heiligen Krieges’" gegen sozialistische Kräfte "zu betonen".[7]
– Lobend erwähnte er den saudischen König Ibn Saud, der nach einem Besuch in den USA "alle Araber aufgerufen" habe, "sich dem Kommunismus zu widersetzen". 1957 urteilte eine von der Regierung in Washington eingesetzte Arbeitsgruppe, man solle im Zweifelsfall eher mit islamistischen als mit gemäßigt islamischen Kräften gegen den Realsozialismus kooperieren. Nur wo sozialistische oder an Moskau orientierte Kräfte keine Bedeutung mehr hatten, verlor die Zusammenarbeit des Westens mit islamistischen Kräften ihre Funktion; um 1990 herum war dies fast überall der Fall.
– Dennoch zeigt die Entwicklung, dass die westliche Gegnerschaft gegenüber der Muslimbruderschaft keine prinzipielle ist, sondern von den politischen Umständen abhängt – und unter entsprechenden Bedingungen wieder in ein Bündnis umschlagen kann.[8]
[1], [2] Eric Trager: Unverwüstliche Muslimbruderschaft. Düstere Aussichten für ein freies Ägypten und einen friedlichen Nahen Osten, Internationale Politik November/Dezember 2011
[3] Deutschland hält Kontakte zur Muslimbruderschaft; www.ftd.de 24.11.2011
[4] Eric Trager: Unverwüstliche Muslimbruderschaft. Düstere Aussichten für ein freies Ägypten und einen friedlichen Nahen Osten, Internationale Politik November/Dezember 2011
[5] Egypt and the Idealist-Realist Debate in U.S. Foreign Policy; www.stratfor.com 06.12.2011
[6] Ägyptischer Herbst; www.faz.net 04.12.2011
[7] Ian Johnson: A Mosque in Munich. Nazis, the CIA, and the Muslim Brotherhood in the West, Boston/New York 2010. S. dazu Der religiöse Faktor und die Doppelrezension: Der politische Islam im Westen
[8] Ein Beispiel hierfür bietet die Kooperation des Westens mit islamistischen Milizen in Libyen im Krieg gegen Muammar al Gaddafi. S. dazu Wichtiger als Menschenrechte
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