(Cfr. PM n.9, “Costituzione, regioni e petrolio in Irak”)
Tesi D.
L. Horowitz, docente Duke University, autore “Ethnic Groups in Conflict”:
USA devono appoggiare richieste sunnite
di revisione della Costituzione,
per maggiore centralizzazione,
meno poteri alle regioni.
- Dopo elezioni, le due maggiori
coalizioni sciita e curda, che otterranno probabilmente più del 50%,
cercheranno di includere dei gruppi sunniti nella coalizione di governo, - ma per includere i sunniti
occorre concedere loro la revisione della Costituzione, che in base ad accordi
pre-referendum, è possibile realizzare entro 4 mesi. - La Costituzione, su
richiesta curda e con benestare sciita, crea quello che è forse il più debole
Stato federale al mondo, con regioni che hanno poteri esclusivi e anche il
potere di creare loro “forze di sicurezza” oltre alla polizia. - I poteri delle regioni non
possono essere modificati da potere centrale se non con assenso dei parlamenti
regionali e referendum regionali. - L’Iraq diverrebbe uno Stato di
tre regioni, ciascuna dominata da un gruppo etnico-religioso. - Sunniti anche allarmati da
disposizioni che paiono legare futuri introiti petroliferi alla localizzazione
regionale dei giacimenti (nord curdo, sud sciita). - USA hanno interesse ad appoggiare
revisione costituzionale chiesta da sunniti, per prosciugare l’appoggio alla
resistenza sunnita, e coinvolgerli nel governo. - Senza forti pressioni USA ciò non
è possibile, per la decisa opposizione curda, mentre sciiti sono ambivalenti,
essendovi forti minoranze sciite in area sunnita e curda; ma hanno brutti
ricordi del centralismo a direzione sunnita. - Senza il freno USA, un governo
curdo-sciita “si toglierà i guanti” contro la resistenza. - Senza modifiche alla
Costituzione, il sud sciita sarà sotto influenza Iran,
- la regione di fatto sovrana del
Curdistan entrerà in attrito con la Turchia, - la regione sunnita farà da base
al terrorismo islamico, - le forze armate delle tre regioni
potranno andare in guerra tra loro sul trattamento delle minoranze e per le
entrate petrolifere.
- Le potenze coloniali,
andandosene, hanno lasciato la propria impronta nelle costituzioni in Asia e
Africa. “Ė ora che USA facciano lo stesso”.
By DONALD L. HOROWITZ
December 14, 2005; Page A20
The Iraq elections tomorrow will revive the
constitutional dispute that is certain to have a profound impact on the future
of that country. A post-election crisis is likely.
A half dozen major political groupings are
contesting the election. Together, the main Shiite and Kurdish lists might
win more than 50% of the seats, but they will feel a strong imperative to
coalesce with one or more of the Sunni lists. The big questions are whether
such a coalition can prove durable and whether it can stem the insurgency.
The main policy priority of the Sunnis is the
constitution. Before the referendum, Sunnis secured a concession allowing
amendments to be proposed within four months by a committee of the new
legislature. Nothing is more important to Iraq’s future stability than
these amendments to a poorly conceived and poorly drafted document that is
loaded against Sunni preferences.
The product of a Kurdish agenda to which
Shiites signed on, the constitution creates an exceedingly weak central
government and extraordinarily powerful regions.
More than that, it assumes that political life will be lived mainly in the
regions, rather than in Baghdad. The upper house, to represent
provinces and regions, is mentioned in the constitution but is not even to be
brought into existence until after the next legislative elections, years
away. The central government has few powers in its exclusive control. It
shares many powers with regions and provinces, which also have their own
exclusive powers, including all powers not explicitly delegated to the central
government. Among the dangerous powers accorded the regions is the
authority to create "internal security forces," in addition to police.
Furthermore, all regional powers are entrenched. They cannot be altered
without the consent of regional legislatures and regional referenda.
The Iraqi state created by this constitution
is probably the weakest federation in the world. Since provinces, Sunni
as well as Shiite, have every incentive to unite into regions, what is really
envisioned is a state of three regions, each dominated by one of the
three large groups. Nothing could be further from habitual Sunni thinking about
Iraq as a unified, centralized entity committed to the Arab world. Sunnis are
also alarmed by a provision that seems to tie the distribution of future oil
revenues to the location of the resource in one region or another. Iraq’s oil
is in the Kurdish north and Shiite south.
The future of an inclusive government will
therefore turn on Sunni success in achieving fundamental change in these
constitutional arrangements. Sunnis have much to offer in return for
constitutional change in their direction. If a sense emerges that Sunnis are an
integral and influential part of the new Iraq, the Sunni population will be
much less inclined to be tolerant of the insurgency. Insurgents find it hard to
survive when they are not supported by the civilian population around them. The
U.S., therefore, has every reason to side with the Sunnis in pushing for a
revised constitution.
Without a strong American push, there are
grounds to think these efforts will probably fail.
The first is that the Kurds have waited a long time for a constitution
like this, and they will dig in their heels. Shiites are more ambivalent,
which is not surprising: There are many Shiites in what would become the
Sunni-dominated central region, as there are other minorities in all three
regions. Yet Shiites have bitter memories of a centralized, Sunni-dominated
Iraq. They see safety in regionalism. In the earlier constitutional deliberations,
Kurdish and Shiite negotiators met privately outside the formal venue and
carved up the constitution according to their preferences, excluding Sunni
delegates who had been added to the process to placate the Americans. This
history, and the sheer size of the gap between Sunni and non-Sunni visions,
make the odds against fundamental change long indeed.
But if major changes are not adopted, Sunni
parties can scarcely continue in a governing coalition. And if they go into
opposition over such a fundamental issue, it will be exceedingly difficult to
reduce support for the insurgency. In a real sense, peace turns on the
constitution.
Freed of American restraint, a
Shiite-Kurdish government will ultimately take off the gloves against the
insurgents. Brutal tactics may show some success,
but not as surely or as quickly as starving the insurgency of Sunni support.
For the U.S., the failure of new
constitutional negotiations has major implications beyond continuation of the
insurgency. If strong regional governments take hold, Iraq will present not one
but four problems. In the Shiite south, there is the prospect of a most
unwelcome Iranian influence. In the north, a de facto sovereign Kurdish state
is likely to create friction with Turkey, a U.S. ally. In the center, an
embittered Sunni entity will be a base for Islamist terrorists, and could be
controlled by those who are now merely insurgents. The armed forces of
each region will have the capacity to go to war with the forces of the others
over the treatment of minorities, the distribution of oil revenue or
terrorist incursions across regional boundaries.
These dismal prospects may not come to pass,
but cannot be dismissed. The constitution is only one piece of the Iraq puzzle,
but for the Sunni — and for the U.S. — it is surpassingly important. Departing
colonial powers left their imprints on new constitutions all over Asia and
Africa, and many of these proved durable. It is time for the U.S. to do the
same.
Mr. Horowitz is professor of law and political
Science at Duke University and author of "Ethnic Groups in Conflict"
(California, 2000).