Le liti di Baghdad fanno scricchiolare i legami con l’ Iran
● Finora l’Iran non è riuscito a unificare in Irak le fazioni sciite attorno ad un candidato, come ha fatto in Libano riunendoli dietro Hezbollah; troppi anni di conflitti e competizione tra i vari leader sciiti iracheni.
● Vittima inattesa degli scontri per la formazione del governo che durano da 7 mesi tra le fazioni politiche irachene l’influenza iraniana sui gruppi sciiti iracheni in lotta tra loro.
– Fallito il tentativo pre-elettorale iraniano di riunire i leader sciiti in una coalizione per preservare la maggioranza sciita in parlamento (come già nelle elezioni del 2005),
– dopo le elezioni Tehran ha sollecitato gli sciiti a formare una coalizione ad hoc per sostenere il primo ministro Nouri al-Maliki, sciita conservatore.
o Il chierico sciita Muqtada al-Sadr, ha schierato i parlamentari del suo movimento a favore di Maliki, avvantaggiandolo nella formazione di un nuovo governo.
o Appoggia Maliki anche il presidente iracheno Jalal Talabani, il leader di etnia curda con i più forti legami con l’Iran. La decisione finale spetta però al presidente del Kurdistan iracheno (KRG), Massud Barzani, il cui partito detiene la maggioranza dei seggi curdi.
o Barzani, che nel passato ha avuto tensioni con l’Iran e con Maliki, ha dichiarato al vice-presidente Usa, Joseph Biden, che i curdi stanno ancora valutando la situazione e gli sviluppi, e aderiranno ad un governo solo se basato su una “vera alleanza”.
– L’alleanza di Maliki e Sadr è una sconfitta per gli interessi Usa, che hanno fatto il possibile per impedire che Sadr (il cui esercito del Madhi ha dato filo da torcere alle forze Usa dopo il 2003) avesse troppa influenza nel prossimo governo.
– Tra i leader sciiti che non condividono il sostegno ad al-Maliki anche Ammar al-Hakim, capo del Consiglio Supremo Islamico del partito d’Irak (SCII),
o appartenente alla dinastia sacerdotale e politica educata in Iran, considerato un importante pilastro della tradizionale leadership sciita in Irak,
o I curdi, alleati di cui Maliki non può fare a meno, chiedono che al-Hakim faccia parte del prossimo governo.
o Dal punto di vista numerico la defezione di al-Hakim non è molto importante, controllando un numero di seggi inferiori a quelli di al-Sadr.
– La defezione di Hakim dallo schieramento di Maliki è, secondo alcuni analisti, una sconfitta strategica per l’Iran, che starebbe premendo su Hakim perché faccia marcia indietro.
– Sarebbero in corso negoziati per la formazione di una coalizione tra Hakim, Allawi, il principale rivale di Maliki per il premierato – ex primo ministro, sciita laico – leader di un blocco che comprende un buon numero di sunniti – ed altri per corteggiare i curdi,
o che disponendo di 57 seggi sono corteggiati da entrambe le parti.
o Quale sarà lo schieramento che conquisterà l’appoggio dei curdi dipende dalla forza o dalla debolezza del’influenza iraniana,
o e dalle concessioni che il governo centrale darà su petrolio e confini della regione autonoma del Kurdistan.
– Al-Hakim si è anche incontrato con alcuni funzionari Usa,
o che per ridurre l’influenza dei radicali, come Al-Sadr premono per un governo di unità tra Allawi e Maliki.
Nelle elezioni di marzo, Maliki ha ottenuto 89 seggi, contro i 91 di Allawi; Sadr 40; con l’eventuale appoggio di alcuni altri parlamentari sciiti, a Maliki mancano 30 seggi per la maggioranza sui 325 seggi parlamentari.
– As Iraqi politicians wrangle through a seventh month of government-formation talks, an unexpected casualty is emerging: Iranian influence over the country’s fractured Shiite groups.
– Before inconclusive March parliamentary polls, Iran had pushed Iraq’s Shiite leaders to rally under one umbrella coalition to preserve a sect-based majority in parliament, as they did in the previous elections in 2005, according to several Iraqi politicians.
– When this failed, Tehran urged Shiites to reunite, post-elections, in an ad hoc coalition backing Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a conservative Shiite.
– Iran appeared to have scored a big victory on Friday when the Iran-based firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr did an about-face and told lawmakers in his movement to endorse Mr. Maliki, giving the incumbent prime minister a big leg up in trying to form a new government.
– That move, however, spurred the defection of other prominent Shiites, including Ammar al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq party, or ISCI. Mr. Hakim is m.
– After Mr. Sadr’s announcement, Mr. Hakim—a member of a clerical and political dynasty cultivated in Iran—sent representatives to meet with the camp of Mr. Maliki’s top rival for the premiership, Ayad Allawi. Mr. Allawi is a former prime minister, a secular Shiite and leader of a bloc with significant Sunni presence. Last week, Mr. Allawi accused Iran of working to block his prospects for the job.
– Mr. Hakim and his deputies also met with U.S. officials, who had been quietly pushing a unity government between Messrs. Allawi and Maliki to dilute the influence of radicals such as Mr. Sadr.
– Mr. Hakim controls fewer seats than Mr. Sadr, so his defection from Mr. Maliki isn’t numerically significant. But he is seen as an important pillar in Iraq’s traditional Shiite political leadership, one that other partners Mr. Maliki needs, most crucially the Kurds, insist be represented in the next government.
– According to several politicians, talks are under way to assemble a possible coalition between Mr. Allawi, Mr. Hakim and others to woo the Kurds, who have emerged as kingmakers.
– Mr. Maliki won 89 seats in the March polls, edged out by Mr. Allawi’s 91. With Mr. Sadr’s 40 parliamentary seats, and the tentative backing of a handful of other Shiite lawmakers, Mr. Maliki is roughly 30 seats short of the majority in the 325-seat parliament.
– Both sides are courting the Kurds, who control 57 seats. That courtship, too, could be determined by the strength—or weakness—of Iranian influence.
– Kurdish support is contingent upon Baghdad making major concessions over oil and disputed internal boundaries to the semiautonomous Kurdistan region, governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government.
– Outwardly, the alliance between Messrs. Maliki and Sadr appears a setback for Washington’s interests here. U.S. officials have pushed to prevent the cleric, whose Mahdi army was a potent insurgent threat to U.S. forces after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, from having too much influence in the next government.
State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley on Friday downplayed the importance of Mr. Sadr’s backing of Mr. Maliki and said "more dialogue among the major parties" was needed to "stand up an inclusive government."
– But Mr. Hakim’s defection from Mr. Maliki is considered equally significant, as a strategic defeat for Iran, according to analysts. Mr. Hakim is under intense pressure from Iran and its allies to reconsider his position, according to a senior Iraqi official.
– Since the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s many sectarian and ethnic groups—each backed to some extent by foreign actors—have jostled for power in the country, which is majority Shiite but had been under Sunni rulers since its modern founding. Shiite and Sunni bloodshed threatened to tip the country into full-fledged civil war a few years ago. That led to comparisons with Lebanon, where various foreign-sponsored confessions fought for years. In Lebanon, Iran succeeded in unifying Shiites behind Hezbollah, the militant Islamist group it backs with Syria.
– So far in Iraq, Tehran has failed to get the various Shiite factions working together. "Iraq is not Lebanon," said Faleh A. Jabar, a Beirut-based Iraqi scholar and researcher on Shiites.
– In an interview last week, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq acknowledged Tehran’s desire to see Shiites here united around one candidate, but denied preference for Mr. Maliki. "We advise our friends all the time to put their differences aside," said Hassan Danaie-Far at his office in Baghdad. "Fortunately we have connections and ties to all political groups in Iraq, starting from the north to the south," he added.
– Still, permeating the Iraqi Shiite political leadership is years of animosity and competition, dating back to individual politicians’ time in exile. Mr. Maliki has alienated many onetime Shiite allies with what critics call his autocratic style. Mr. Maliki said in an interview with state-owned television over the weekend that he needed to exert strong leadership to keep the country together, and fight terrorism and the insurgency.
– Hadi al-Ameri, a senior lawmaker from a faction of Mr. Hakim’s party, said Iranians have worked hard to make Mr. Maliki’s case. Still, he is unconvinced that Mr. Maliki is the suitable nominee for Shiites.
"A second term for Maliki is not a solution but a crisis," said Mr. Ameri in an interview, adding, "The Iranians have not been able to change our view on Maliki and this is proof that the Shiite decision is purely Iraqi."
– Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, the Kurdish leader with the strongest ties to Iran, has pushed hard for backing Mr. Maliki. But the final say belongs to the president of the KRG, Masoud Barzani, whose party holds a majority of Kurdish seats.
– Mr. Barzani has had a difficult relationship with Iran and with Mr. Maliki in the past. Mr. Barzani spoke to U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden over the phone on Sunday, telling him that Kurds were still "assessing the situation and developments" and would only join a government based on "true partnership," according to a statement issued by Mr. Barzani’s office.
—Jay Solomon contributed to this article.
————————-
As Maliki Clings to Power, Iraq’s Fissures Deepen
BAGHDAD — When Nuri Kamal al-Maliki began his bid for re-election as prime minister — exactly a year ago on Saturday — he pledged to unite a population splintered and suspicious after years of war. He has not, and while he is hardly alone in blame, the consequences could haunt Iraq for years to come.
The purging of ballot lists before the election, the contentious and inconclusive challenges to the results, and the protracted delay in forming a new government since then have all deepened the ethnic, sectarian and societal cracks in a newly democratic state as fragile as an ancient Babylonian vase.
– Sunni leaders in particular are angry at the prospect that they may be disenfranchised once again.
“The past four years have been full of injustice and oppression,” Atheel al-Nujaifi, a Sunni who is governor of Nineveh Province in northern Iraq, said Sunday in Mosul.
– He accused Mr. Maliki of having abused his authority by arresting opponents, pressuring the courts, and hiring and firing security forces based on sectarian identity — practices, Mr. Nujaifi said, that Mr. Maliki continued even now as a caretaker leader with no mandate or parliamentary oversight. “Mr. Maliki’s continuation as prime minister will create a dictatorship,” he warned.
– Even plans to conduct a census this month ran afoul of these divisions. On Sunday, Mr. Maliki’s caretaker government postponed the census — the first in years — until December after angry protests that an accurate count of the country’s population would rub raw the divides, especially in regions like Kirkuk and Nineveh, with myriad peoples and territorial disputes.
– The challenge now is for Mr. Maliki to overcome the divisions and suspicions — among Sunnis, above all — that have dogged Iraq since its creation in 1920 under British rule, cobbled together out of disparate Ottoman provinces. Even though Mr. Maliki is all but assured of leading the next government, it could take weeks or months more for him to persuade the Sunnis to join the government in some way.
– Mr. Maliki secured the nomination for a second four-year term on Friday, but he did so with the support, save one, of only fellow Shiites, in particular the followers of a radical cleric, Moktada al-Sadr, who not long ago were involved in the fighting that plunged Iraq into civil war.
– Mr. Maliki, whose bloc narrowly lost the election in March to a secular and largely Sunni coalition led by Ayad Allawi, has fought so tenaciously to regain his post, and alienated so many potential allies in government, that few on Sunday said they believed his pledges, once again, to unite all Iraqis under his leadership.
Among Iraq’s Sunnis the view is acute and disturbing, given the disenfranchisement that once provided Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremist groups succor.
The electoral map of Nineveh, like that of all Iraq, traces the fault lines that divide the country and could yet sunder it, violently or otherwise.
Mr. Allawi’s alliance, Iraqiya, won an overwhelming majority of the province’s 31 seats outside the area under the control of the semiautonomous Kurdish region, which Mr. Nujaifi cannot even visit. Mr. Maliki’s State of Law coalition did not win a single seat there. The same was true in the Sunni provinces of Anbar and Salahuddin. The coalition won only one seat north of Baghdad, in Diyala. By contrast, Mr. Maliki or his main Shiite rivals won in all the provinces of the overwhelmingly Shiite south, while Mr. Allawi picked up only a handful of seats there.
Baghdad, like Kirkuk and Diyala, was split, like the neighborhoods that even now, despite improved security, are defined as either Sunni or Shiite, separated by checkpoints and blast walls that outsiders are wary to pass.
In the Sunni quarters on Sunday, despair, anger and fear prevailed. A common view blamed Iran, Iraq’s Shiite neighbor, for orchestrating Shiite dominance of a multicultural nation. Many accused Mr. Maliki of resorting to political expedience to retain power, rather than exercising national leadership.
In the Adhamiya area of Baghdad, a parking lot attendant who gave his name only as Suhaib Abu Farah, which means father of Farah, said another four years with Mr. Maliki would roil the streets. “The only choice for Iraqi men,” he said, “is either leaving Iraq or joining armed groups for money.”
The election — Iraq’s second for a new Parliament since the American invasion in 2003 — was supposed to blur the sectarian divisions that the toppling of Saddam Hussein exposed, if not erase them entirely.
To an extent, all the major parities and blocs sought to appeal to voters outside their bases, which are defined not by ideology as much as identity.
“National unity” was the theme, but when all the votes were counted — then recounted and finally certified months ago — identity triumphed. In an interview this summer, Mr. Maliki himself expressed disappointment that when it came to sectarianism, the country had returned to “square one.”
Of course, all sides blame one another for sectarianism, but the election results made it inevitable. One reason a government has not yet been formed is that Mr. Maliki had to spend the past seven months shoring up his nomination first among Shiites, overcoming a challenge from rivals for the post, including Vice President Adel Abdul Mahdi.
Mr. Maliki now has the support of at least 148 members of the new 325-seat Parliament, just short of a majority. With the support of the Kurds, who have 57 seats in all, he could easily form a government that excludes Sunnis almost entirely.
That is the biggest fear of the United States, as well as many Iraqis. Obama administration officials have pushed for a compromise power-sharing agreement that would allow Mr. Maliki to retain his post, but curb his authority and bring in Mr. Allawi’s alliance, with its Sunni supporters.
“If the result is a government that has a leadership role for Iraqiya and the Kurds as well as Maliki, I think that’s a good result that reflects the elections,” a senior Obama administration official said Sunday. But “if there’s somehow a government that results in the grouping together of one faction or another with the exclusion of one major group, that’s not a good result.” The official spoke on condition of anonymity because of the delicacy of the negotiations.
Mr. Allawi, a secular Shiite who served as interim prime minister in 2004 and 2005, arguably had the most success in building a coalition that crossed sectarian lines in the election, winning 91 seats to Mr. Maliki’s 89.
In the aftermath of Mr. Maliki’s nomination, he has reached out to Mr. Mahdi’s party, as well as other smaller parties representing Sunnis and Shiites. His supporters have vowed not to negotiate with Mr. Maliki to join the government in a subordinate role.
The math appears to be against Mr. Allawi, though, unless he can overcome the disputes between Sunnis and Kurds in Nineveh, Kirkuk and Diyala, which few believe is possible.
The sole Sunni in Mr. Maliki’s bloc, Hajim al-Hassani — who was appointed to a compensatory seat, not elected outright — said Sunday in an interview that Mr. Maliki intended to create a governing coalition that distributed posts in correlation to the percentage of votes.
“We have to create an environment where there is no marginalization,” he said. “Iraq today is a democratic society. We must represent all Iraqis.”
The question is whether Mr. Maliki now can. The Association of Muslim Scholars in Iraq, a Sunni organization, said Mr. Maliki’s sectarianism was merely a reverse of the Sunni domination of Iraq under Mr. Hussein’s dictatorship.
“Iraq’s fate,” the organization said in a statement, “is at a tipping point.”
Reporting was contributed by Omar al-Jawoshy and Yasir Ghazi from Baghdad, an employee of The New York Times from Mosul, Iraq, and Helene Cooper from Washington.
Published by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI)
Washington moves to thwart Sadrist role in a new Iraqi government
– The decision of the anti-US Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr to throw his support behind caretaker Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in the months-long stalemate over the formation of a new government in Iraq has set off a flurry of political jockeying within the country and sparked alarm in Washington.
– Sadr, in self-imposed exile in Iran since 2007, had up until the announcement on Friday opposed a second term as prime minister for Maliki.
o Backed by US forces, Maliki in 2008 broke the grip of Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia in Baghdad’s Sadr City Shiite slum as well as in the southern Shiite capital of Basra. While ordering his supporters to put down their arms, Sadr has continued to denounce the US occupation and called for the total withdrawal of US troops.
– As a result of Sadr’s anti-occupation posture, his was the only party to gain new seats in the national parliamentary elections held on March 7, winning 39 of the 325 positions.
– In the election, the Iraqiya block headed by former prime minister and one-time CIA asset Ayad Allawi won the most seats, 91,
– while Maliki’s State of Law bloc won 89. However, both Allawi and Maliki fell far short of the overall 163 majority needed to form a new government, and neither has in the intervening seven months been able to cobble together a sufficiently large coalition.
– Maliki’s bloc is almost entirely Shiite and overtly religious.
– Allawi, a Shiite, won the votes of secular Shiites and the overwhelming majority of Sunni voters.
– The Kurdish parties, which wield quasi-autonomous power in the north of Iraq, won 57 seats.
– Allawi has insisted that his bloc will not participate in any government headed by Maliki and has refused to date to entertain the possibility of a broad coalition regime. He has warned of a new outbreak of violence by Sunnis and other minorities.
– Washington, fearful that the emergence of an openly sectarian Shiite government will fuel sectarian violence within Iraq and increase Iranian influence over the country,
o has been pressing for some form of power sharing between Maliki and Allawi.
o The Obama administration has been particularly intent on excluding from power Sadr and his pro-Iranian allies in the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The Sadrist forces and ISCI make up the bulk of the Iraqi National Alliance, which made the official announcement Friday nominating Maliki to succeed himself as prime minister.
Maliki hailed the announcement in a televised statement broadcast Friday evening, casting it as a decisive breakthrough in the political stalemate that paves the way for his return to power. He appealed to Allawi and his supporters to participate in a government under his leadership.
However, in a statement on the web site of Allawi’s party, spokesman Hayder al-Mulla said a Shiite-dominated government headed by Maliki would violate the voters’ desire for “a genuine partnership” of Iraqi groups.
– Kurdish spokesmen hailed the announcement and said it increased the likelihood that they would throw their support behind Maliki and propel him to a second term. Kurdish lawmakers met over the weekend to map out their agenda for negotiations with Maliki, set to begin today.
– The Kurds will press their demands for control over the oilfields around Kirkuk, including the right to implement deals with foreign oil companies they have unilaterally negotiated, for even greater political autonomy, and for the holding of a much-delayed referendum on political control of Kirkuk, currently contested between the city’s Kurdish, Sunni Muslim and Turkmen populations.
Kurdish spokesmen have also demanded an “inclusive” government with representation from Allawi’s Iraqiya block.
A spokesman for the Sadrists said they have demanded key government posts, including deputy parliamentary speaker and as many as six of the 34 cabinet-level ministry positions to be filled. They are insisting on a post linked to security operations and have raised the possibility of holding the trade ministry. Another party official said the Sadrists would seek the prime minister post after the withdrawal of the remaining 50,000 US troops.
This is anathema to the United States, and Washington will use its immense influence as the occupying power to frustrate these plans. There are already suggestions that some Shiite factions within the Iraqi National Alliance will not go along with Sadr’s support for Maliki, and Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc announced Friday that it was initiating talks with two smaller Shiite groups in the alliance, as well as ten other deputies.
The Obama administration has pressed for a resolution of the government impasse, fearing that a continuation of the logjam will fuel political instability and civil strife. However, there are clear signs that it will work to prolong the stalemate rather than allow Sadr and other pro-Iranian forces to gain significant power in a new government.
The Washington Post reported Friday: “But in Washington, a senior Obama administration official said he did not expect Maliki to be able to form a government with the Sadrists and suggested that the agreement may end up accelerating negotiations over a broader-based government. A split among Shiites, with major groups refusing to go along with the Sadrists, leaves Maliki ‘still 30 seats short of a majority,’ the official said. ‘He needs to deal.’”
The US has officially adopted a posture of neutrality toward the outcome of the governmental horse trading in Iraq, but former officials and the media have made clear Washington’s hostility to the Sadrists gaining a political foothold. The Post quoted Kenneth Pollack, an analyst with the Brookings Institution and Iraq policymaker in the Clinton administration, as saying, “The Sadrists having a key role in the next government of Iraq was one of the few redlines that the Obama administration had. They’ve staged this major comeback, and the administration is very, very worried about that. This is something Iran has been trying to do for months. Clearly this is a big win for them and really bad for us.”
The New York Times on Saturday quoted Daniel P. Serwer, a vice president at the United States Institute of Peace, as saying in an email: “An Iraqi government that owes its existence to the Sadrists and lacks strong support from Allawi would necessarily be one that leans in Tehran’s direction, something Washington can little afford at the moment.”
Just last week, the deputy commander of US forces in Baghdad accused a Sadr-linked militia group of being behind a surge of rocket attacks targeting the US embassy and other US installations.
As the Times article broadly hinted, a major concern of the US is that the presence of the Sadrists would complicate plans being worked out between Washington and Baghdad to maintain a substantial US troop presence in Iraq after the end of 2011, when all US troops are supposed to be removed under the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement between the two countries.
“One of the main issues facing Iraq in the coming year,” the article concluded, “is what, if any, American military presence will continue after the deadline in December, 2011 for withdrawing the remaining 50,000 American troops here.
“Diplomats and military commanders here have already signaled an interest in maintaining a close security relationship with Iraq as it rebuilds its armed services and solidifies its fragile democratic institutions.
“While many Iraqi political and military leaders have expressed support for that, the Sadrists remain opposed to what they call ‘a foreign occupation.’”
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