Asia Pacifico, Tomor Est, Australia, Petrolio Wsws 06-06-06
Australia, Timor e petrolio: documentazione
Mike Head
Il nuovo dispiegamento di truppe internazionali a guida
australiana a Timor Est segue una serie di decisioni importanti del governo del
partito Freitlin di Dili (capitale di Timor Est), volte a ridurre o almeno
controbilanciare l’egemonia australiana sui giacimenti del Mar di Timor. Coinvolte
grandi compagnie di Italia-Portogallo (ENI), India, Cina.
–
dicembre
2004, il primo ministro Alkatiri, che è anche ministro delle Risorse
naturali, ha annunciato prospezioni petrolifere nella parte di mare di Timor da
parte di un consorzio
comprendente China National Petroleum
e la norvegese Global Geo-Services.
–
Nel
2005 il governo di Alkatiri avrebbe negoziato con PetroChina la costruzione di una raffineria a Timor, andando contro
i progetti australiani di inviare tutto il greggio del Mar di Timor a Darwin. Alkatiri
ha anche chiesto che l’Australia si impegnasse a non bloccare il trasferimento via
oleodotto del petrolio di Greater Sunrise a Timor.
–
Nel settembre
2005 Timor ha lanciato una campagna per mettere sul mercato
internazionale i suoi giacimenti gas e petrolio, e in febbraio un’“asta”,
a cui hanno partecipato una
ventina di compagnie petrolifere internazionali, tra le quali:
–
l’italiana
ENI, la GALP portoghese (in cui ENI è socio di maggioranza) la brasiliana Petrolio
Brasileiro (Petrobas), la malese Petronas e l’indiana Reliance. Assenti le
compagnie USA e australiane.
Il 22 maggio, con le forze australiane già presenti sulle
navi da guerra al largo dell’isola, Alkatiri annuncia che il gruppo
italo-portoghese ENI aveva vinto il diritto di esplorazione di 5 delle 6 aeree,
il resto va all’indiana Reliance.
La destabilizzazione del governo Alkatiri ha inizio proprio
a febbraio (350 ufficiali marciano sul palazzo presidenziale accusando di
trattamenti discriminatori, scendono in sciopero, il governo ne licenzia 600,
1/3 delle forze armate di Timor, il fatto è sfruttato dal maggiore ribelle addestrato
in Australia, che minaccia la guerriglia se il presidente Gusmao non depone il
primo ministro Alkatiri). Gusmao cancella la visita programmata in Cina.
Sotto il Mar di Timor calcolate riserve del valore di oltre
$30MD.
La bozza segreta dell’Australian Defence Force (ADF), del 10
maggio 2001 e pubblicata la scorsa settimana dalla rivista Bulletin, sostiene
che obiettivo primario della presenza militare australiana è assicurare che
governo e forze armate di Timor siano disponibili a soddisfare gli interessi australiani;
gli interessi strategici australiani sono 1. impedire che potenze straniere
abbiano facile accesso a Timor Est; 2. ottenere al contrario soddisfacente accesso
per l’Australia; 3. mantenere un buon livello di influenza sui processi
decisionali di Timor Est.
Brevissimo sunto relazioni Australia-Timor Est
– Sia
i governi liberali che
laburisti australiani accettarono di collaborare con il dominio coloniale portoghese,
fino al crollo del governo fascista portoghese nel 1974;
– a
questo periodo risalgono le prime scoperte di giacimenti petroliferi
sottomarini; nei primi anni 1970 furono dati i diritti di prospezione a diverse
compagnie.
– Camberra temendo l’instabilità
dell’isola con l’abbandono del Portogallo, e mirando al potenziale energetico, incoraggia (come gli USA) la giunta
indonesiana di Suharto ad invadere nel 1975 l’isola e reprimere la popolazione
(200mila vittime nei seguenti 25 anni). Suharto accetta di negoziare i confini sottomarini a favore
dell’Australia, a cui consegna
quasi tutte le riserve
sottomarine con il Timor Gap Treaty del 1989.
– 1998, cade Suharto, il Portogallo
cerca di riaffermare i suoi interessi, il governo Howard manda le truppe per appoggiare
la costituzione di un mini-stato formalmente indipendente nel 1999. Nei mesi
seguenti il governo australiano si impone a Timor Est per avere la maggior parte
del petrolio e del gas, al posto del Portogallo.
– febbraio 2000, poco prima del
trasferimento all’Amministrazione transitoria ONU di Timor Est (UNTAET), l’Australia
insiste per ottenere due importanti trattati: uno è la continuazione del Timor
Gap Treaty, l’altro apre la
strada a un consorzio USA-Australia-Giappone per lo sfruttamento del grande
campo di Bayu-Undan, con 400 milioni di barili di LPG stimati, 250 km. a
sud di Suai, Timor Est e 500km a nor-ovest di Darwin. L’accordo comprendeva la costruzione di un gasdotto fino
a Darwin, dove ConocoPhillips (Huston)
ha commissionato una raffineria di $2,4 MD.
– Entrambi
i trattati miravano a vincolare qualsiasi futuro governo timorese.
–
ottobre
2000, il governo
australiano Howard respinge la richiesta UNTAET di revisione del confine
sottomarino. Se i confini fossero tracciati a uguale distanza dalle due
linee costiere, secondo il
diritto internazionale, Timor Est avrebbe quasi tutte le royalty e le imposte derivanti
dal Mar di Timor.
– Camberra
minaccia ritorsioni se Timor si dovesse rivolgere al Tribunale internazionale, collegando
gli aiuti australiani (il 90% usato per scopi militari) alle royalties ottenute
da Dili.
– Marzo 2002, due mesi prima dell’indipendenza,
l’Australia annuncia che non accetta le disposizioni del Tribunale
internazionale sulle linee di confine marittimo; cerca di far cedere da Alkatiri
la maggior parte del giacimento Greater Sunrise ($25 MD) all’Australia.
– il
maggior azionista di Greater
Sunrise è la società con sede in Australia Woodside Petroleum (in cui Royal
Dutsch/Shell ha il 34%), assieme a ConocoPhilipps e alla giapponese Osaka Gas.
– Si calcola che l’area contenga tanto
gas quanto la vicina piattaforma North West Shelf (100 trilioni di piedi
cubi, sufficienti a produrre circa 2 MD di tonnellate di LPG, in grado di
soddisfare tutta la domanda mondiale per oltre un decennio).
– Timor
Est sottoscrive un trattato che però non definisce il confine marittimo,
Camberra ostacola allora l’avvio dei progetti per Bayan Undan e Greater Sunrise,
privando Timor delle entrate petrolifere: a cinque anni dalla “liberazione” di
Timor metà della sua popolazione era disoccupata, il 40% viveva con $50 cent al
giorno, l’aspettativa di vita era di 40 anni, e la mortalità infantile tra le
più alte del mondo.
– Nel
solo 2003 l’Australia ricevette $172mn. di royalty dal campo di
Laminaria-Coralina, una somma pari al doppio dell’intero bilancio di Timor.
– Dili
è costretta, aprile 2005, a rinunciare alle rivendicazioni territoriali per
50-60 anni.
– Risultato:
nel 2004-05 le entrate da gas e petrolio di Timor sono state di soli $25mn, somma che dovrebbe giungere a
$75 nel 2007-08.
A parte gli altissimi profitti delle società petrolifere, il grosso
delle royalty di Timor, $550mn. dall’aprile 2006, è congelato in buoni del tesoro
americano in un Fondo petrolio dietro insistenza del FMI e della BM.
Da sito ENI:
an Donato Milanese (Mi) – 24
maggio 2006 – Eni si è
aggiudicata i diritti esplorativi in cinque nuovi permessi nel Mare di Timor
(denominati A, B, C, E e H). I permessi, assegnati a seguito di una gara
internazionale indetta dalla Repubblica di Timor Est, sono situati a nord della
zona amministrata congiuntamente da Timor Est e dall’Australia, un’area ad
elevato potenziale dove sono già state effettuate importanti scoperte di
idrocarburi. La profondità d’acqua dei permessi varia da 0 a 3000 metri.
Questo successo consente a Eni di
consolidare la propria presenza nel bacino australiano nord-occidentale. In
quest’area Eni partecipa a diversi progetti esplorativi e di sviluppo di
idrocarburi e detiene il 12% nel
giacimento di liquidi e gas Bayu Undan, la cui produzione di liquidi è stata
avviata nel 2004, e nell’impianto di liquefazione di Darwin della capacità
produttiva di 3,5 milioni di tonnellate anno di GNL.
In linea con la strategia di valorizzazione
delle risorse locali dei Paesi in cui opera, Eni intende contribuire alla
crescita della giovane Repubblica di Timor Est favorendo lo sviluppo e
l’utilizzo delle capacità locali sia in termini di risorse umane che tecniche.
Wsws 06-06-06
Australia, Timor and oil: the record
By Mike Head
In all the Australian media coverage of
the Howard government’s latest armed intervention in East
Timor, the words “oil” and “gas” are hardly mentioned. Yet control over the vast reserves
beneath the Timor Sea—now valued at more than $30 billion due to rising world
oil and natural gas prices—lies at the heart of the dispatch of troops and
police.
Together with the wider strategic and commercial
calculations of the Australian ruling elite, domination over the Timor
Sea—and blocking access to all foreign rivals—has been the overriding concern throughout every cynical
twist and turn in Canberra’s
policy toward East Timor over the past three decades.
–
Successive Australian governments, both Liberal
and Labor, accepted and
collaborated with Portugal’s
colonial rule over the half island until 1974, when Portugal’s fascist government collapsed.
–
At about the same time came the first indications
of the undersea wealth—oil exploration wells were drilled offshore in the early 1970s, and
rights were granted to several companies.
–
Eyeing this potential and fearing instability in Timor as
Portugal’s grip crumbled, Canberra, following
Washington’s lead, encouraged the Suharto junta in Indonesia to invade in 1975
and suppress the population, ultimately at the cost of 200,000
lives over the next quarter century. In return, General Suharto agreed to negotiate
an underwater boundary heavily in Australia’s favour, handing it nearly all the seabed
reserves under the 1989 Timor Gap Treaty.
–
After Suharto fell in 1998, and Portugal stepped up moves to reassert
its old colonial interests, the
Howard government sent in troops to
support the formation of a nominally independent mini-state in 1999. Ostensibly, the purpose was to protect the Timorese people from
Indonesian military and militia violence.
–
The media and all those, including an array of “left”
middle class protest groups, who called
for the 1999 intervention, claimed it marked a “humanitarian” turn in Australian foreign policy.
–
It was nothing of the sort. Within months, the Howard government
was bullying and blackmailing the embryonic Dili administration to ensure that Australia, not East Timor or Portugal, kept
the lion’s share of the oil and gas.
–
In February 2000, just before the Australian-led International Force
in East Timor (Interfet) formally handed power
to troops of the UN Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET),
Australian representatives insisted on signing two critical treaties.
–
The first continued the Timor Gap Treaty,
with the UN simply replacing Indonesia as Australia’s partner in the joint
development zone.
–
The second cleared the way for a US-Australian-Japanese consortium to exploit
the large Bayu-Undan field. Expected to yield up to 400 million barrels of liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG), now valued at more than $5 billion, this gas field is 250km south of Suai in East Timor and 500km
northwest of Darwin.
The agreement foisted on Dili, however, involved building a pipeline to Darwin, where the Houston-based
ConocoPhillips has commissioned a $2.4 billion refining plant.
Both these treaties, initialled by UN officials,
were designed to legally bind
any incoming “independent” East Timor
government. As for Timor’s people, in whose name Australia had
intervened, they were given no say in the arrangements whatsoever.
–
In October 2000, the Howard government flatly rejected a
UNTAET call for the realignment of the undersea boundary. If the borders were drawn
at an equal distance from both coastlines, in keeping with international law,
East Timor would be entitled to nearly all the Timor Sea
royalties and taxes.
Howard and his ministers issued thinly veiled threats of
retaliation against East Timor if it dared
take the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
directly linked the future of Australia’s
aid program—90 percent of which was devoted to military purposes—to the size of
royalties obtained by Dili. Downer’s colleague, Resources Minister Nick
Minchin, warned that a border dispute would destroy “investor confidence” in
the Timor Gap.
–
In March 2002, just two months before East
Timor was proclaimed “the first newly independent country of the
twenty-first century,” the Howard government announced it would no longer submit
to maritime border rulings by the World
Court. East Timor’s
Prime Minister-elect Mari Alkatiri denounced the move as an “unfriendly” act,
“tying the hands” of his incoming government.
In May, a week before Prime Minister Howard flew
into Dili for the Independence Day celebrations, Alkatiri was summoned to Canberra, where
Australian government officials tried to strong-arm him into signing an agreement ceding most of
the vast $25 billion Greater Sunrise field to Australia.
–
Australian-based company Woodside Petroleum, which is 34
percent-owned by Royal Dutch/Shell, is the major shareholder in the Greater
Sunrise field, in partnership with ConocoPhillips and Japan’s Osaka Gas.
–
The area is thought to contain as much gas as the nearby
North West Shelf, Australia’s largest resource
development, which is also operated by Woodside. The North West Shelf has identified reserves of 100
trillion cubic feet, sufficient to make about 2 billion tonnes of LPG, enough to meet world demand
for more than a decade.
Unable to secure full agreement immediately,
Downer and other ministers demanded that Alkatiri accept some form of treaty as
the new nation’s first “independent” act. Alkatiri duly obliged, but signed the May 20 document “without prejudice” to a final seabed
determination.
From that point on, the Howard government repeatedly refused
to approve various agreements necessary to commence the Bayan Undan and Greater
Sunrise projects, thus starving the Timorese government of desperately
needed revenue, until Dili
agreed to delay or renounce its territorial rights.
The thuggish character of the
“negotiations” was revealed in
March 2003, when the
transcript of a meeting between Downer and Alkatiri in November 2002 was leaked
and published on the Internet.
“We can stop everything,” Downer
repeatedly declared, threatening to pull the plug on the talks. Alkatiri
pleaded with Downer, “We want to accommodate all your concerns, but
accommodating is one thing and scraping off a plate is another.” Downer
reiterated that the boundary would not be redrawn, saying “you can demand that
forever for all I care, you can continue to demand, but if you want to make
money, you should conclude an agreement quickly”.
The Howard government deliberately
dragged out the border dispute, all the time drawing revenues from the Timor
Sea, while East Timor sank deeper into
poverty.
–
During 2003 alone, Australia received $US172 million
in royalties from the fully operational Laminaria-Corallina field—twice as much
as the entire budget of the East Timorese government.
–
With only a trickle of oil
revenue and the drying up of international aid, the government in Dili had little to spend on schools,
health care, housing or job creation.
–
Five years after East Timor’s so-called “liberation” by Australia,
half its working people
remained jobless, 40 percent of the population were living on 50 US cents or
less a day, life expectancy was just 40 years and infant and mortality rates
were among the highest in the world.
During another round of border talks in April 2004, East Timor’s President Xanana Gusmao
joined Alkatiri in a series of public pleas for relief from Australia’s
merciless approach. Alkatiri insisted that a new agreement that would give East Timor a greater share of the offshore revenues was a
matter of “life and death”.
–
Speaking to the Portuguese newspaper Publico, Gusmao openly
accused Australia
of theft. In an interview with the Guardian, he warned
of dire political consequences unless East Timor
got a better deal. “We would not like to be another failed state. Without this
we will be another Haiti,
another Liberia, another Solomon Islands.”
Nevertheless, Canberra’s browbeating continued until, in April 2005, Dili finally agreed
to drop its border claims for 50-60 years. In effect, East
Timor was forced to abandon its rights for two generations, by
which time the main oil and gas fields will be thoroughly depleted.
–
So much for “independence” and
Australian “liberation”. The upshot has been that, in 2004-05, East Timor’s
oil and gas revenues came to a total of just $US25 million. This amount
is forecast to rise to $75
million in 2007-08. Apart from the super-profits being made by the oil
companies, the bulk of the country’s royalties, $US550 million by
April this year, are frozen in US treasury bonds in a Petroleum Fund at the
insistence of the IMF and World Bank, supposedly to provide for the
country’s future.
Renewed intervention
–
The current troop deployment follows a number of key
decisions by the Fretilin-led government in Dili that sought to lessen, or at
least counter-balance, Australian hegemony over the Timor
Sea fields. Disturbingly for Canberra, these
efforts have involved Portugal.
–
Washington, on whose support the Howard
government depends entirely, is also concerned about China’s intervention.
– In December 2004, Alkatiri, who is also the country’s Natural Resources Minister, announced that a consortium
involving China’s largest
state-owned oil group, China National Petroleum, and Norway’s Global Geo-Services
would conduct a full seismic exploration of the Timorese side of the sea
boundary. This immediately raised the spectre of China
and the European powers, which are generally aligned with Portugal, gaining a degree of control of East Timor’s reserves.
– During 2005, according to some reports, Alkatiri’s government entered into talks with China’s PetroChina to build refining capacity in
Timor, cutting directly across Australian plans for the piping or
shipping of all Timor Sea crude, from both sides of the border, to Darwin. Alkatiri also called for undertakings
by Australia that it would
not block the piping of oil from Greater Sunrise to Timor.
While details have remained sketchy,
these reports featured in media, diplomatic and business commentary in the
lead-up to the Australian intervention. Writing in the Australian on May 9, columnist Philip Adams declared that Alkatiri’s
“insistence on having gas production facilities in Timor’s Suai area rather
than Darwin may open the door to China;
PetroChina seems to have the deal stitched up. Many in the Western
diplomatic and corporate communities think that’s too close for comfort.”
– Loro Horta, the son of Timor’s Foreign Minister Jose Ramos-Horta,
wrote in the Asia Times
on May 27: “There was also widespread speculation that Alkatiri planned to
award a multibillion-dollar gas-pipeline project to PetroChina, an invitation
that would have won both the United States’ and Australia’s ire.”
– Last September,
Alkatiri kicked off an international
tour to attract oil and gas explorers to East Timor’s
own offshore area of some 30,000 square kilometres, declaring that “Timor-Leste
is open for business”. In
November he reported that these efforts attracted more than 20 petroleum
companies, “among them some of the biggest in the world”.
– In January
this year, after six years of bitter negotiations, Alkatiri finally extracted a minor concession from the
Howard government. Canberra reluctantly agreed
to a 90-10 share, in East Timor favour, of the proceeds from part of the Greater Sunrise field—the 20 percent that lies in the
so-called Joint Petroleum Development Area, which sits astride the disputed
border line. The agreement
shares equally (50-50) the royalties from the remaining 80 percent of Greater
Sunrise, in what Australia
claims as its exclusive jurisdiction.
Earlier the Howard government had
insisted on a more aggressive siphoning of revenues to Australia. But, in response, the Timor parliament threatened to scuttle the April 2005
deal in which Alkatiri’s government had agreed to abandon its claim for the
redrawing of the boundary.
– In February,
the Dili government called
tenders for its own Timor Trough fields after the Chinese-Norwegian survey
estimated that the area held half a billion barrels of light oil, and some 10
trillion cubic feet of gas (about 10 percent of the total estimated Timor Sea
reserves).
– By the April 19 deadline, five companies had submitted bids, either individually or in consortia.
They were Italy’s
ENI, Portugal’s GALP (in
which ENI is the majority shareholder), Brazil’s
Petroleo Brasileiro (Petrobas), Malaysia’s
Petronas and India’s
Reliance. Noticeably, none were from the US
or Australia.
– It was during this
period, from early February onward, that the destabilisation of the Alkatiri
government began. On February 8, some 350 officers and soldiers abandoned their posts and
marched to the presidential palace, claiming discriminatory practices within
the military. The “petitioners” went on strike throughout March, and the
government in Dili responded
by dismissing nearly 600—a third of the East Timorese armed forces. The mass sackings triggered riots
that began a descent into chaos, which was soon exploited by an Australian-trained army rebel, Major
Alfredo Alves Reinado, who threatened a guerrilla war unless Gusmao sacked
Alkatiri.
– On May 22, with Australian
forces already on warships off the coast, Alkatiri announced that ENI, the
Italo-Portuguese conglomerate, had won the rights to five of the six
exploration areas, with Reliance gaining the remaining field. Alkatiri also confirmed that his government would call for bids for
onshore exploration rights later in the year.
– One immediate
outcome of the eruption of unrest in East Timor and the arrival of
Australian troops was that Gusmao
cancelled a trip to China.
He had planned to visit China,
at the invitation of President Hu Jintao, from May 29 to June 3, and Beijing’s interest in oil
and gas exploration was expected to be on the agenda.
– By sending troops and police the Howard government has moved to
secure its interests in the Timor Sea, as well
as the wider Indonesian archipelago. Despite the lip service being paid to
respecting Timor’s “sovereignty,” the latest intervention continues, and
escalates, a long history of Australian imperialist intrigues against Timor’s long-suffering people.
The underlying agenda was spelt out in a leaked Australian Defence Force (ADF)
minute published last week in the Bulletin news magazine.
– The classified
minute to the Chief of the Defence Force, dated May 10, 2001, stated in no uncertain terms that the
primary goal of Australia’s ongoing military presence was to ensure that the
fledgling Timorese government and its army was sufficiently amenable to Australian
interests.
o
“The first objective,” it said
“is to pursue Australia’s broad strategic interests
in East
Timor, namely denial,
access and influence. The strategic interest of denial seeks to ensure that no foreign power
gains an unacceptable level of access to East Timor, and is coupled with the
complementary objective of seeking access to East Timor for Australia, in particular the ADF.
Australia’s strategic interests can
also be protected and pursued
more effectively if Australia maintains some degree of influence
over East Timor’s decision-making.”
Predictably, the media blacked out any
further reportage of this damning document and its implications. The
confidential minute, written by the ADF’s Strategic International Policy
Division, related specifically to the ADF’s “Defence Co-operation” program in
shaping the development of the East Timor Defence Force. Nevertheless, it set
out in a nutshell the entire orientation of Australian policy, laid down by the
Howard government itself.
Wsws 06-06-06
The
looting of East Timor’s Serious Crimes Unit
The following contribution was sent to the World Socialist Web Site on
May 31 by a former United Nations official in East Timor concerned about the
ransacking of East Timor’s Serious Crimes Unit
on May 30. The unit was established by the UN to
investigate acts of violence carried out in 1999 by the Indonesian military and
pro-Indonesian militia both before and after the UN-sponsored referendum on independence.
For those of us who believe in and
respect the supremacy of national sovereignty, East Timor is now a sordid saga. In a blatant
act of neo-colonialism, 1,300 Australian troops together with 500 support
personnel have taken control of the capital Dili, all under the pretext of
preventing civil war and helping the Timorese people. This intervention aims at
installing a compliant regime and at protecting Australia’s economic as well as its
strategic interests.
While the Australian troops have already
been installed, the situation does not seem to have calmed down. During the past week, approximately
27 Timorese have died and nearly 100 have been injured. Yesterday it was
reported that ambulances were ferrying casualties on the streets of Dili but it
is not clear how many more have been injured or died. Apart from the deaths and
injuries, looting and arson have continued in Dili over the past two days.
UNOCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs) through its ReliefWeb site has reported that, out of an original
population of 150,000 in Dili, as of now 65,000 have been displaced. It fears that the number may rise. Most of the expatriates have
already fled, but the locals are facing an acute shortage of rations and
drinking water together with medical and sanitation facilities, which
ironically are regarded as luxuries in this crisis situation.
“Aid workers expressed frustration at
the insecurity despite the presence of more than 1,300 foreign troops from Australia, New
Zealand and Malaysia. The troops seemed unable
to stop the machete-wielding gangs that have terrorised the capital,” CNN
reports.
In another article, the Jakarta Post
reports: “Machete-wielding mobs torched houses and ransacked government
offices, including the attorney general’s where they succeeded in breaking into
the Serious Crimes Unit. Files
involving all of the most prominent Indonesian defendants in the 1999 massacres
that followed East Timor’s bloody vote for independence, including former
General Wiranto, were stolen, said Attorney General Longuinhos Monteiro.”
Attorney-General Longuinhos Monteiro
told the BBC on May 30 that
his offices had been looted on several occasions and up to 15 percent of the
criminal archive stolen. The Australian NEWS.com.au reported: “UN
security guards fled when looting began. Attorney-General Longuinhos Monteiro
confirmed at least 12 percent of all files had been stolen.”
Although the extent of damage is still
not very clear, it is certain that the records of both the Prosecutor General’s
Office and the defunct Serious Crimes Unit have been looted. For the sake of
argument, one could ask, why would a mob be interested in looting the records
of the defunct Serious Crimes Unit and particularly the case file of General
Wiranto? I am afraid ordinary citizens in Timor-Leste [East
Timor] may find it very difficult to answer.
–
The United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET), following UN Security Council Resolution
1272, established the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU). UNTAET also set up the Special
Panels of Judges at Dili District Court to hear cases of serious crimes. The United
Nations spent millions of US dollars to establish and maintain the courts. In
independent East Timor, the Serious Crimes
Unit is a section of the Office of the General Prosecutor as established under
the constitution of the Democratic Republic of East Timor (RDTL). The unit had
concentrated on crimes against humanity in widespread or systematic attacks
against civilians, as well as individual offences of murder, rape, torture and
other crimes committed in East Timor between 1
January and 25 October 1999.
Being a bit skeptical, I am trying to find an answer as to why the
Prosecutor General, as well as his supervisor President Xanana Gusmao and the
SRGS Hasegawa (UN representative in East Timor),
did not make proper security arrangements. They had all the resources at
hand—particularly 1,300 fully-armed Australian troops together with local and
international police—in order to safeguard the assets of the defunct Serious
Crimes Unit (SCU). Moreover, they know well the pattern of trouble in Dili.
To solve this puzzle is perhaps
difficult at the moment. However, the following clues may point to the
underlying factors behind the plot to loot and destroy the records.
* It is much easier for the Dili-based leadership,
particularly for President Xanana Gusmao, to gain further sympathy from
Indonesia if, instead of judicial trials of high-ranking Indonesian army
officials, including General Wiranto, there is emphasis on his initiative for
reconciliation. At the same time, it might work as a tactic for him to lessen the
Indonesian government’s anger following his invitation to the
Australians to solve the internal problems of Timor-Leste.
* The incident may provide an
opportunity for Longuinhos Monteiro, who is the Prosecutor General of the
republic (and reports to President Xanana Gusmao), to shift his
responsibilities and get a clean slate. If further investigative efforts were
to be orchestrated by the international community, it would send a signal that
Timor-Leste is not a safer place. Longuinhos Monteiro, who was once very
enthusiastic in carrying out the task of the Serious Crimes Unit, later came
under pressure from President Gusmao and initiated a court motion to withdraw
the indictment against General Wiranto, thus undermining the efforts of the
Unit. Nonetheless the Special Panel Judge rejected the court motion.
* Notwithstanding President Gusmao’s
initiative and eagerness for reconciliation through the Commission on
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CVAR), there may be regional and strategic
interests. The US, with the
full backing of Australia,
wanted to exert pressure on Indonesia
under the pretext of seeking justice for crimes against humanity. The Serious
Crimes Unit of the United Nations seemed to be a viable forum. However, after
the Timorese policy shift towards Indonesia,
a need has been felt by the US
and its international allies to establish an International Tribunal either in East Timor or outside. The incident of record looting may
justify further efforts to regain the momentum and pave the way for the
establishment of an International Tribunal.
The records and assets of SCU are not
just simple bookkeeping. Rather, they consist of full investigations; an
inventory of exhibits; statements from victims and witnesses; indictments;
arrest warrants; court proceedings and court judgments. What bothers me more is
that confidentiality, as well as trust in the system, has now been completely
shattered. Victims and witnesses, not only in Timor-Leste but also in other
parts of the world, might now use this shameful incident as an excuse not to
cooperate.
Another underlying implication that
needs urgent attention is the danger that the perpetrators, suspects and their
accomplices, who committed the atrocities, may now be able to identify the
witnesses and read their statements. If they seek revenge, more bloodshed is
likely. There is also the possibility that the perpetrators, suspects and their
accomplices, most of whom now live in Indonesia, may try to take care of
those who gave evidence against them. If that is the case, the looting might
have been a case of infiltration. Australia,
perhaps, will not lose the opportunity to shift its responsibility for the
destabilisation of the country onto Indonesia,
because it might also like to see some bitterness develop in the relationship between
Dili and Jakarta.
An act of prejudicial and prima facie
sabotage against the Timorese and international community’s efforts and
resources has taken place. Both the national and international community will
soon start raising its voice to demand that President Xanana Gusmao and SRSG
Hasegawa equally accept full responsibility for this irreparable loss.
Therefore, I venture to suggest that all
efforts be made to investigate the incident and strenuous efforts be exercised
to recover the looted records as soon as possible.