Il 14-15 Dicembre è stata inviata una delegazione
statunitense a Pechino per un “dialogo strategico economico” guidata dal
Segretario del Tesoro degli Usa Paulson comprendente anche altri dirigenti
economici
·
Sebbene
abbia risposto alle richieste di protezionismo da parte del Congresso, la Casa
Bianca è preoccupata dell’impatto economico delle sanzioni commerciali alla
Cina sugli Usa e sull’economia mondiale.
·
Al
centro della crisi attuale vi è la riluttanza della Cina a permettere una
rapida rivalutazione della sua moneta, lo yuan. Da quando è finito il regime
precedente del tasso di cambio fisso in Luglio 2005, lo yuan è stato rivalutato
solo del 5,7% – molto meno delle richieste del Congresso per una crescita
contro il dollaro statunitense del 15-40%.
Sezioni
del Congresso, con i Democratici in testa, accusano la Cina di “manipolare” la
sua moneta per danneggiare l’economia statunitense. Cosi come 27 proposte di
legge minacciano tariffe contro l’export cinese negli Usa. Come hanno predetto
gli economisti, il deficit commerciale statunitense con la Cina raggiungerà un
record di 240 miliardi $ quest’anno, più dei 202 miliardi $ del 2005.
·
Con
la crescita del commercio e dei disavanzi dei bilanci, la Casa Bianca vuole
un’azione immediata per rendere il commercio con la moneta cinese più
flessibile e un’ulteriore
deregolamentazione dei settori finanziari guidati dallo stato. Allo stesso
tempo, ha bisogno di assicurarsi che il Congresso non ponga fine agli immensi
flussi di capitali cinesi e merci a basso costo, vitali per l’economia
statunitense.
Le
critiche da parte dei Democratici e delle burocrazie sindacali delle “ingiuste
regole commerciali” cinesi riflettono le condizioni sempre peggiori in sezioni
meno competitive dell’industria statunitense.
La
sezione più potente dei vertici della finanza degli Usa si oppone alle sanzioni
commerciali alla Cina. La preoccupazione delle grandi società statunitensi è
che le misure protezioniste minino la loro abilità nell’investire e mietere
immensi profitti in Cina.
Secondo
il Dipartimento del Commercio statunitense, la Cina ha superato il Messico
quest’anno come secondo maggior partner commerciale degli Usa dopo il Canada.
Il commercio tra Usa e Cina ha raggiunto i 328 milioni $- 10 volte il livello
del ’92. Inoltre, la Banca Centrale cinese sta aiutando a finanziare l’immenso
commercio degli Usa e i disavanzi delle partite correnti ed ha accumulato 700
miliardi $ nelle obbligazioni del governo statunitense e in altre attività
espresse in dollaro. La Cina ora ha riserve monetarie estere da 1 trilione- le
maggiori al mondo. Come l’indebolimento del dollaro, l’afflusso di capitale
cinese ed asiatico è stato cruciale nel mantenere a galla l’economia
statunitense colpita dal debito.
·
Una
paura maggiore di Washington è che le tariffe statunitensi contro la Cina
destabilizzino le relazioni finanziarie. In un rapporto della Banca della
Popolo cinese si afferma che: “se i capitali esteri smettessero di affluire
negli Usa, potrebbe esserci una caduta significativa del dollaro statunitense
con diminuzione dei consumi e degli investimenti, aumento degli interessi e
agitazione nei mercati finanziari- mettendo in pericolo la stabilità
finanziaria ed economica globale”.
·
La
Banca Centrale cinese sta cercando di diversificare i suoi portafogli di
riserva monetaria estera in euro, oro e altre monete per ridurre il rischio di
dipendenza dalla banconota. Pechino sta cercando di ridurre le attività col
dollaro senza creare il panico e un uscita del mercato statunitense che
potrebbe provocare un tumulto finanziario. Comunque, tutti i maggiori
investitori stanno facendo lo stesso, aumentando solo l’instabilità nei mercati
finanziari e monetari.
·
Come
in altre occasioni, i dirigenti cinesi e statunitensi nei dialoghi a Pechino
hanno sottolineato il bisogno della Cina di incoraggiare una crescita economica
guidata dal consumo. Uno yuan più caro è visto in larga parte come un modo di
aumentare il potere di acquisto dei consumatori cinesi aumentando cosi le
importazioni dagli Usa. La diversificazione del sistema finanziario cinese
dietro le attuali banche guidate dallo stato potrebbero trasformare l’alto
tasso di risparmio cinese in spese nazionali.
Comunque,
questa prospettiva è piena di contraddizioni. Mentre la classe media urbana ha
azionato una crescita nei consumi, la maggioranza della popolazione cinese -lavoratori
e contadini- non possono permetterselo.
Il
settore tessile cinese, che da solo dà sostentamento direttamente o
indirettamente a 100 milioni di persone, è particolarmente vulnerabile. Sta già
operando con bassi margini di profitto del 3-5 %. Il governo ha previsto che 15
milioni di persone nelle città in cerca di lavoro non troveranno lavoro il
prossimo anno. Pechino ha paura che la crescita di disoccupazione porti allo
scoppio di agitazioni sociali e politiche.
US-China “strategic economic dialogue” underscores sharpening trade
tensions
By John Chan
20 December
2006
An unprecedented US delegation sent to Beijing for the first session of a
proposed twice-yearly “strategic economic dialogue” on December 14-15
highlights the sharpening trade tensions between the US and China.
Headed by US Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson, the high-powered team included virtually every senior
US economic official: Federal Reserve Board chairman Ben Bernanke,
US trade representative Susan Schwab and the secretaries of commerce, labour,
energy, health and human services as well as the head of Environmental
Protection Agency. A day before the US party
arrived, former US President George Bush senior met Chinese President Hu
Jintao.
As widely expected, nothing concrete came out of the “dialogue”. For all
of the rhetoric calling for Chinese leaders to speed up “market reform,” the
Bush administration was walking a fine line. While responding to protectionist demands from Congress,
the White House is deeply concerned about the economic impact on the US and world economy of trade
sanctions against China.
At the heart of the
current crisis is China’s reluctance to allow a rapid
revaluation of its currency, the yuan. Since ending the previous fixed exchange
rate regime in July 2005, the yuan has revalued only 5.7 percent—far less than
Congressional demands for a rise against the US dollar of 15-40 percent.
Sections of Congress, with
the Democrats in the forefront, accuse China of “manipulating” its currency
to damage the US economy. As many as 27 proposed
bills threaten tariffs against Chinese exports to the US. As economists had predicted,
the US trade deficit with China will reach a record $240 billion
this year, up from $202 billion in 2005.
Paulson’s proposal in September for a US-China dialogue sought to
extract concessions from Beijing
and preempt drastic action in the Congress, particularly in the lead up to
mid-term Congressional elections in November. Once the Democrats regained a Congressional majority, a
more antagonistic approach dominated Washington’s debate on China.
New Democratic majority leader Nancy Pelosi strongly opposed China’s
admission into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. Commenting prior to
the US-China dialogue, she declared: “Many of us in the Congress will be
watching closely.”
Christopher Dodd, the incoming chairman of the Senate Banking Committee,
demanded strong action. “I’ve listened to previous secretaries [of the
treasury] talk about jawboning on this issue and being patient, ‘things are
moving in the right direction’. But it’s pretty difficult to explain to the
American people day after day that a major competitor of ours, now a member of
the WTO, is still fixing its own rates at a great disadvantage to us.”
Just days before the US-China talks, a report by the US trade
representative to Congress on China’s entry
into the WTO accused Beijing
of failing to meet WTO requirements, including opening up sections of the
Chinese economy and cracking down on widespread copyright breaches.
If the bilateral dialogue failed, the report threatened, “the
administration will not hesitate to employ the full range of enforcement tools
available as a result of China’s accession to the WTO, whether it be the
dispute settlement procedures at the WTO or the strict enforcement of US trade
laws to ensure that US interests are not harmed by unfair trade practices”.
Paulson made no secret of Washington’s
protectionist threats, saying: “I think the message in this report is
consistent with our messages previously.” He told reporters the world would
“run out of patience” if Beijing’s
economic reforms, including a rapid revaluation of the yuan, moved too slowly.
When meeting with Chinese officials, however, Paulson significantly
toned down his rhetoric. “As you know, there is resistance in both our
countries to greater integration into the global economy, and there is also
skepticism that this dialogue will accomplish anything of substance,” he
declared.
More dramatic was Bernanke’s speech to the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences. The Federal Reserve chairman omitted an accusation that Beijing’s
currency policy was an “effective subsidy” on exports, and grounds for charging
China
with violating WTO principles. Instead he used a less inflammatory term,
describing the yuan regime as a “distortion” to global trade. Bernanke’s
spokeswoman insisted he had not been under any pressure to modify his speech,
even though the original version, with the term “effective subsidy,” was posted
on the Fed’s website.
The Chinese government rejected US criticisms. Vice Premier Wu Yi
warned: “Some American friends not only have limited knowledge of, but harbour
misunderstandings about, the reality of China.” She
pointed out that after the “extremely barbaric economic depredation” of the
imperialist powers in nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China was still
a developing country with a per capita income of just $1,700. Wu reiterated Beijing’s policy
of pro-market “reform and opening up” and promised greater protection of
intellectual property rights and the “rule of law”.
The Bush administration is not interested in being lectured on the
reality of China,
however. With rising trade
and budget deficits, the White House wants immediate action to make China’s currency trading more flexible
and further deregulation of the state-run financial sector. At the same time,
it needs to ensure that Congress will not disrupt the huge inflows of Chinese
funds and cheap goods that are vital for the US economy.
Criticisms by Democrats
and American trade union bureaucrats of China’s “unfair trade practices”
reflect the deteriorating conditions in less competitive sections of US industry. Unable
to match rivals that have shifted or outsourced production to China and other
low-wage countries, these layers have to massively cut wages and conditions to
stave off collapse. Protectionist measures will do nothing to stop the assault
on the living standards of American workers, but are designed to divert
attention from the real root of the rising social inequality and poverty—the
profit system—and blame workers in China who are
often exploited by the same US corporations.
The most powerful sections
of the US financial elite oppose trade sanctions against
China. Former
President Bush senior told an audience of Chinese university students: “My
worry is that some of the leaders in the new Congress are anti-free trade; they
are more for protectionism.” The
concern of the large US corporations is that
protectionist measures will undermine their ability to invest and reap huge
profits in China.
In a recent comment, the Wall Street Journal defended China’s
economic policies as being more open than those of Japan and India. “When China won the
WTO’s seal of approval in late 2001, it was a signal to the world that Beijing wasn’t
going to turn its back on capitalism. That sent a flood of foreign investment
sweeping into China,
surging from roughly $40 billion annually in the years before 2002 to more than
$70 billion last year.”
According to the US
Commerce Department, China overtook Mexico this year as the second biggest
trading partner of the US after Canada. US-China trade has reached $328
billion—10 times the level in 1992. In addition, China’s central bank is helping to
finance the huge US trade and current account
deficits and has accumulated $700 billion in US government bonds and other
dollar-denominated assets. China now has foreign currency
reserves of $1 trillion—the largest in the world. As the US dollar has
weakened, the inflow of Chinese and Asian capital has been crucial in keeping
the debt-stricken US economy afloat.
A major fear in Washington is that US tariffs against China will destabilise financial
relations. A Chinese People’s Bank report, released
on December 7, pointed to the dangers of a loss of international confidence in
the US dollar. “If
external capital stops flowing into the United States, a significant drop in the US
dollar may occur with consumption and investment shrinking, interest rising and
financial markets experiencing turbulence—endangering global financial and
economic stability,” the report warned.
The Chinese central bank
is trying to diversify its foreign currency reserve portfolios into euros, gold
and other currencies to reduce the risk of relying on the greenback. Beijing is trying to reduce its dollar
assets without creating panic and a rush out of the US market that would trigger
financial turmoil. However, all major investors are doing the same, which is
only increasing volatility in the financial and money markets.
As on other occasions, US
and Chinese officials in the Beijing dialogue pointed to the need for
China to encourage consumption-led economic growth.
A more expensive yuan is widely regarded as a way of increasing the buying
power of Chinese consumers and thus increasing imports from the US. The diversification of China’s financial system beyond the
present state-run banks, the argument goes, could transform China’s high rate of saving into
domestic spending.
However, this perspective
is riddled with contradictions. While a small layer of the urban middle class
has propelled a growth in consumption, the vast majority of the Chinese
population—the working class and rural poor—are struggling to make ends meet.
The impact of a higher yuan on exports could cost millions of jobs, leading to
a decrease in consumption by Chinese workers.
To encourage domestic spending, Beijing would
also have to significantly increase real wages and expand the provision of
healthcare, education and pensions. But such measures would further undermine China’s main
economic advantage as a source of cheap labour—leading to further job losses.
China’s textile industry, which alone supports
directly and indirectly 100 million people, is particularly vulnerable. It is
already operating on tight profit margins of 3-5 percent. The government has
forecast that 15 million urban job seekers will not find a job next year.
Beijing fears that any rise in job losses would lead
to an eruption of social and political unrest.
A Financial Times editorial on December 18 warned Beijing must
nevertheless make changes. “Either it responds constructively to Mr. Paulson’s
initiative with actions that strengthen both its own economy and his ability to
restrain more bellicose political forces at home; or it runs the risk that
those [US
protectionist] forces will prevail, with incalculable consequences for both
countries’ interests. Given the strength of anti-Chinese feeling in the US, not much
time is left to make that choice.”