Irak,
fazioni
Sembra che Moktada al-Sadr stia perdendo il controllo
di parte della milizia irachena
SABRINA TAVERNISE
Secondo i servizi americani, dopo l’assunzione di impegni di
governo Moktada al-Sadr non avrebbe più il controllo di un terzo circa dell’esercito
del Mahdi, che sta dividendosi in squadre e gruppi della morte che si offrono
ai maggior offerenti, soprattutto a Basra, S-E Irak.
La scissione crea problemi agli americani che di recente avevano
di fatto sospeso gli attacchi agli uomini di al-Sadr in Sadr city, e apre maggiori
possibilità all’influenza dell’Iran che non si limita a finanziare ed armare
gli scissionisti del Madhi, non potendo prevedere chi arriverà a predominare.
Sarebbero sei i maggiori leader disobbedienti a Sadr, che
continuano a ricevere finanziamenti dalla sua organizzazione.
Sadr ha trasformato in potere politico la forza militare di
cui ancora dispone (ancora di 7000 uomini a Baghdad): 30 seggi nel parlamento;
la sua partecipazione era un obiettivo centrale USA.
Sadr ha iniziato ad intervenire maggiormente a
Kirkuk e nella provincia di Dyala (Nord Irak), entrambe aeree con popolazione
mista, dove si presenta come difensore degli sciiti contro le fazioni curde e
sunnite.
Nyt 06-09-28
Cleric
Said to Lose Reins of Parts of Iraqi Militia
By SABRINA TAVERNISE
BAGHDAD, Sept. 27 — The radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr has lost
control of portions of his Mahdi Army militia that are splintering off into
freelance death squads and criminal gangs, a senior coalition intelligence
official said Wednesday.
The question of how tightly Mr. Sadr holds the militia, one of the
largest armed groups in Iraq,
is of critical importance to American and Iraqi officials. Seeking to
ease the sectarian violence raging across the country, they have pressed him to
join the political process and curb his fighters, who see themselves as
defenders of Shiism — and often as agents of vengeance against Sunnis.
But
as Mr. Sadr has taken a more active role in the government, as many as a third
of his militiamen have grown frustrated with the
constraints of compromise and have broken off, often selling their services to the highest bidders,
said the official, who spoke to reporters in Baghdad on condition of anonymity
because he was not permitted to speak publicly on intelligence issues.
“When Sadr says you can’t do this, for
whatever political reason, that’s when they start to go rogue,” the official
said. “Frankly, at that point, they start to become very open to alternative
sources of sponsorship.” The official said that opened the door to control by Iran.
Mr. Sadr’s militia — dominated by impoverished Shiites who are loosely
organized into groups that resemble neighborhood protection forces — has
always operated in a grass-roots style but generally tended to heed his
commands. It answered his call to battle American forces in two uprisings in
2004, and stopped fighting when he ordered it. But as the violence in Iraq
has spread, evidence of freelancing Shiites has accumulated.
After the bombing of a Shiite shrine in Samarra in February, bands
of militants dressed in black, the favorite color of Sadr loyalists, drove into
neighborhoods, kidnapping and killing Sunnis. Mr. Sadr, who was abroad at the
time, returned home and gave a rare public speech calling on his followers to
stop, even proposing joint prayer sessions with Sunni clerics. Still, the
rampage continued.
In
Basra, a province in
southeastern Iraq,
Mr. Sadr has less direct
control over militiamen, and they have tended to operate to suit their own
agenda. Local leaders there have said that he has disciplined some
members and fired others, but with little overall effect. He has run through
four different leaders in Basra,
according to the intelligence official, and has even had to shut offices
temporarily, when local leaders ignored him and acted on their own.
– Mr. Sadr is still
immensely powerful, with as many as 7,000 militiamen in Baghdad, the official
said. And the cleric has turned that firepower into political might. His
candidate list won about 30 seats in Parliament this year, one of the largest
shares. The participation
was a central goal for American officials, who tried for months to
persuade him to stop fighting and enter politics.
Still,
six major leaders here no longer answer to Mr. Sadr’s organization, according to the intelligence official. Most describe themselves
as Mahdi Army members, the official said, and even get money from Mr. Sadr’s organization, but
“are effectively beyond his control.” Some of those who moved away from Mr.
Sadr saw him as too accommodating to the United States. Others saw him as
too bound by politics, particularly as killings of Shiite civilians in mixed
neighborhoods began to soar.
“They’re not content to sit there and just
defend their family on the street corner,” the official said. “They want to go
out and take on what they view as Al Qaeda or Baathists or both in aggressive
measure.”
– One example is Abu
Dera, a fighter in the Shiite stronghold of Sadr City in the capital who used to be loyal to Mr. Sadr. Residents said
that as he began to gain a reputation for killing Sunni figures, Mr. Sadr told
him to stop. But he ignored the order, and now he is referred to as the “Shiite
Zarqawi,” after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the terrorist leader who exhorted Sunnis
to kill Shiites.
“He started against the Americans, but he
moved on to killing Sunnis,” said Sattar Awad, a 29-year-old resident of the
district. “People here look at him as a brave man.”
American forces are hunting for Mr. Dera, the
intelligence officer said, but he has eluded capture.
– Although the splintering has solved some problems for the American
military, it has raised new ones. “In some ways it makes it easier for me because
I now have digestible doses I can deal with,” said a senior American military
official at a briefing on Wednesday, also in Baghdad. “At the same time it creates
problems because they are harder to find when they are splintered.”
The
splintering has changed the tone of the American military’s interaction with
the Mahdi Army in Sadr
City. In past years, American forays into the area would often draw a
storm of grenade attacks. But
recent American moves into the area have been carried out relatively peacefully:
Mr. Sadr has not ordered attacks because the men being sought were freelancers
like Abu Dera, the intelligence officer said.
– The fighters’
defections have raised the troubling prospect of more avenues of influence for Iran, the senior intelligence official said. The official cited
shipments of weapons with labels that trace back to Iranian weapons manufacturers as evidence that Iran was actively aiding groups in Iraq. And that
assistance has not just been limited to Mahdi Army offshoots. “They’re not sure
who will come out on top, so they fund everybody,” the official said of Iran.
Even Mr. Sadr, who fashions himself as the
quintessential Iraqi nationalist, has reached out to Iran’s
government, making a very public trip to Iran for talks early this year. He
is also trying to reassert control over his power base at home, and to expand
his influence, the intelligence official said. “What Sadr is looking for is
discipline,” the official said.
He said Mr. Sadr had begun to increase his
exposure in the northern city of Kirkuk and in Diyala Province,
both mixed-population areas north of Baghdad
where sectarian disputes have been on the rise. There, he is trying to appeal
by casting himself as a defender of Shiites against Kurdish and Sunni Arab
factions.
Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting.
The New York Times