Un costoso errore [intervista]

Gfp     100512

Un costoso errore

[intervista di German Foreign Policy all’economista svedese Stefan De Vylder.

●    Prima che i politici europei riconoscano che il progetto UE è stato un costo errore ci vorranno una serie di costosi salvataggi, forti proteste politiche e sociali.

●    Dal punto di vista macro-economico è il grande surplus ($175MD) nella bilancia dei pagamenti della Germania che rende di fatto impossibile risolvere i propri problemi alla maggioranza dei paesi UE, la cui competitività internazionale è stata erosa.

●    Gli esportatori tedeschi sarebbero i principali beneficiari di un deprezzamento dell’euro.

 

– La crisi in corso è una crisi di tutto il progetto UE, basato già dagli inizi più sul prestigio politico che su una seria analisi economica.

– La Grecia come capro espiatorio. Senza l’euro non si sarebbe sviluppata in Grecia una tale enorme bolla finanziaria (ma neppure in Irlanda o Spagna)

– È grazie alla sua appartenenza alla UE che la Grecia ha potuto beneficiare di bassi tassi di interesse, di una rivalutazione dell’Euro, di credito a basso prezzo.

– Numerosi i responsabili della situazione attuale: tutti i governi UE, molte autorità UE, compresa BCE, istituzioni finanziarie private, agenzie di rating, etc.

– BCE e UE non hanno messo in guardia dal pericolo del doppio deficit, fiscale e di bilancio, che caratterizza la maggior parte dei paesi UE.

– Il deficit aggregato della bilancia dei pagamenti dei 16 paesi è circa di soli $65 MD,

– ma, tolto il surplus tedesco di $175MD, olandese ($40MD) e austriaco ($10MD), gli altri 13 paesi dell’euro hanno un deficit di quasi $300 MD.

– Dato poi che la maggior parte dell’export della maggior parte dei paesi deficitari è diretto verso altri paesi dell’euro,

o   anche se l’euro si svalutasse la loro competitività internazionale non aumenterebbe.

o   a Germania e zona euro occorrerebbe un forte aumento della domanda interna tedesca, di salari, potere d’acquisto e un aumento dell’inflazione maggiore rispetto a quella degli altri paesi euro; cosa che i politici tedeschi non accetterebbero dato che sarà necessario il denaro tedesco per vari salvataggi in giro.

o   Un’eventuale estromissione della Grecia dalla zona euro non risolverebbe i problemi strutturali della UE.

o   Una forte svalutazione di una nova moneta greca sarebbe un vantaggio per la Grecia, ma indebolirebbe la competitività di altri paesi UE (Italia, Spagna e Portogallo), che competono con la Grecia in settori come agricoltura, industria leggera e turismo.

●    Un tentativo di “governo economico” nella UE accelererebbe probabilmente lo sfascio della UE:

o   è si necessario alla UE un maggior coordinamento della politica economica,

o   ma i suoi cittadini non sono pronti ad assoggettarsi alle decisioni della burocrazia di  Bruxelles per la politica fiscale, sociale e del mercato del lavoro.

– Stanno crescendo tensioni economiche e antagonismi politici nella UE; in molti paesi c’è disoccupazione alta e di lunga durata, nazionalismo e xenofobia. È in gioco il sentimento di solidarietà tra i popoli d’Europa.

– Grecia, Portogallo, Spagna o Italia non saranno a mio avviso i primi paesi ad uscire dall’euro, dato che il prezzo che pagherebbero sarebbe molto alto.

– La Germania troverà invece troppo pesante il fardello da portare per rimanere nella UE. La necessità di salvataggio di paesi che, paradossalmente patiscono per la forza della Germania, non sembra possa dirsi conclusa.

– Due scenari si possono a mio parere prevedere:

o   1. la Germania deciderà che è suo interesse uscire dall’euro, dato che essa non ha bisogno dell’euro per mantenere la propria competitività internazionale e la facilità di accedere ai mercati finanziari.

2. Verrà creata una unione monetaria più ristretta tra Germania, Austria e forse paesi del Benelux e Francia, mentre gli altri paesi UE torneranno alla propria valuta.

Gfp      100512
Ein teurer Fehler
12.05.2010
STOCKHOLM

Über die Euro-Krise und einen möglichen Austritt Deutschlands aus der Eurozone sprach german-foreign-policy.com mit dem schwedischen Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Dr. Stefan De Vylder.

german-foreign-policy.com: Everyone believes that Greece is the culprit of the euro crisis. Do you agree?

Stefan De Vylder: Greece has until now been the ideal scapegoat. A huge fiscal deficit which the previous governments tried to cover with the help of creative bookkeeping and outright cheating. But it was the membership in the currency union[e] that made it possible for Greece to benefit from low interest rates, a rising euro and easy access to cheap credit.

Without the euro, no such tremendous bubble would have developed in Greece (or in Ireland or Spain). And the ECB and other EU authorities failed completely to warn against the danger of the twin deficits – fiscal and current account balances – which characterise most of the EMU countries. It is definitely not fair to single out Greece as the big culprit. The crisis we are witnessing is a crisis for the entire EMU project, which from the very beginning was based more on political prestige than on a sound economic analysis.

gfp.com: Who is the real culprit?

De Vylder: There are a large number of culprits which either have contributed directly to the crisis or failed to warn against it, let alone do something about it: all EMU governments, many EU authorities including the ECB, private financial institutions, rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, and many others.

–   But from a macroeconomic perspective, the biggest single problem is Germany, although I would not call Germany a culprit in a moral sense of the word. But the country’s huge current account surplus makes it virtually impossible for the majority of EMU countries whose international competitiveness has become eroded to solve their problems.

–   If we look at the aggregate current account deficit of the 16 member countries, it does not look alarmingly large: some 65 billion USD. But this figure conceals the fact that Germany alone has a surplus of 175 billion. And the Netherlands has a surplus of another 40-plus billion. And Austria another 10.

–   This implies that the remaining 13 euro zone countries have a current account deficit of close to 300 billion USD. This is a huge figure.

o    And the dilemma is that most of the deficit countries have most of their exports going to other euro countries, which implies that even a depreciation of the euro would fail to restore international competitiveness. Indeed, the main beneficiary of a weakening of the euro would be German exporters.

–   What Germany – and the euro zone in general – would need is a strong increase in effective demand in Germany, with rising wages and purchasing power and a higher inflation than in the other euro zone countries. But I don’t think that German politicians would agree, especially not today when German money is likely to be needed for various rescue operations elsewhere.

gfp.com: Would it solve the problem if Greece were to be thrown out of the euro zone?

–   De Vylder: If Greece were to be thrown out of the euro zone – which in the long run would be good for the country – no structural problem for the entire currency union[e] would be solved.

–   A drastic fall in the value of a new Greek currency would be good for Greece (but would, of course, make the servicing of the country’s euro debt very onerous), but it would further weaken the international competitiveness of other EMU members which are competing with Greece in areas such as agriculture, light industry and tourism. Italy, Spain and Portugal would definitely suffer if Greece left the euro zone while these other countries remained locked in.

gfp.com: Would an EU economic governing body solve the problem?

–   De Vylder: No. Although it is perfectly true that a currency union[e] such as EMU, which by definition has a single rate of interest and a single rate of exchange, would need a far-reaching coordination of economic policies to function even moderately well, people in the EU are – for very good reason – not prepared to have their fiscal policies, social policies and labour market policies determined by a non-accountable bureaucracy in Brussels (with a little help from the IMF in Washington). And attempt to create an "economic government" within the EU would probably accelerate the road to disaster.

gfp.com: What, in your opinion, will happen to the euro in the long run?

–   De Vylder: I would be extremely surprised if today’s euro zone members are still members ten years from now. Extremely surprised. Economic tensions and political antagonisms are growing all the time. Europe finds itself in a very difficult situation. High and persistent unemployment, nationalism and xenophobia are threatening many countries. The European peoples’ sense of solidarity is at stake.

–   If one or several of the weaker countries were to leave the euro zone, the price they would have to pay is likely to be very high (in the short run). For this reason, I don’t think that it will be Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy that will be the first countries to abandon the euro. But I suspect that Germany will find a continued membership a heavy burden. There is no end in sight to the need to bail out countries that are, paradoxically, suffering from Germany’s strength.

–   Germany does not need the euro to maintain its international competitiveness and excellent access to international credit markets. So my forecast is that Germany one day will decide that it is in the best interest of the country – and in the interest of the weaker euro zone countries as well! – to leave the currency union. This would be a very difficult process, but in a longer-term perspective it may be necessary.

Another scenario would be the creation of a smaller currency union[e] between a few member states – Germany and Austria, perhaps, the Benelux countries, possibly France – and let the others go back to their own currencies. Also a very costly process. But compared to defending an extremely poorly designed monetary union, I think the price would be worth paying. The EMU is unlikely to collapse this year, or next. We will probably need a series of expensive bailouts, and mounting political and social unrest, before Europe’s politicians acknowledge that the whole EMU project was a costly mistake.

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