Asia Centrale, Pakistan, Afghanistan, USA, Nato
WSJ 061025
Una questione di confine
BARNETT R.
RUBIN
Tesi WSJ: Pakistan:
– Il
nodo centrale del conflitto Pakistan-Afghanistan e dell’aumento degli attacchi
terroristici in Afghanistan è costituito dalle aree tribali di confine, dove il
Pakistan ha consentito ai talebani di trovare sicuro rifugio.
– assieme
alla lotta per estromettere i talebani, occorre estendere la democrazia alle aree
tribali di confine, dove i partiti sono ora fuorilegge, ed aiutare le forze centriste
e i partiti non settari che hanno vinto le elezioni in Pakistan; occorre ridimensionare
i consolati indiani.
– Deve
iniziare un confronto tra Pakistan ed Afghanistan sulle maggiori questioni
aperte, compreso il riconoscimento di un confine aperto tra i due paesi; l’Afghanistan
deve avere l’accesso alle strutture portuali pakistane.
– USA
e NATO farebbero da garanti di tale processo.
——————-
Dalla creazione del Pakistan, quasi 60 anni fa’, Pakistan e Afghanistan
hanno sempre avuto relazioni ostili, tranne che nei 5 anni di predomino dei
talebani a Kabul.
– L’Afghanistan non ha mai accettato
l’incorporazione nel Pakistan dei territori Pashtun e Beluci; la questione ha
portato la monarchia afgana a cercare l’appoggio militare sovietico per contrastare
le forze armate del Pakistan aiutate dagli USA, e ad allinearsi
diplomaticamente con l’India.
– I
militari pachistani hanno utilizzato i militanti della jihad per raggiungere
diversi obiettivi:
o combattere
una guerra asimmetrica in Kashmir e Afghanistan;
o diffondere
l’islamismo tra i pashtun da entrambi i lati del confine per contrastare i nazionalisti
pashtun e beluci, nel timore che spaccassero il paese;
o cementare
l’alleanza con i partiti islamici, il cui consenso di piazza intimorisce e indebolisce
i partiti centristi.
– Un ruolo centrale in questa
strategia è svolto dalle autorità tribali pashtun, chiamate FATA, Aree Tribali Federalmente
Amministrate: la mancanza di un’amministrazione centrale o di istituzioni politiche
nazionali crea uno spazio in cui possono inserirsi le milizie islamiche per
organizzare ed addestrare.
– Queste
aree tribali sono un residuo coloniale, oggi presentato dai governanti del Pakistan
come depositari di antiche tradizioni: nel 1901, lord Curzon, vicerè dell’India
promulgò le Frontier Crimes Regulations, che ancora regolamentano le FATA.
– Gli
“anziani delle tribù” sono utilizzati in realtà dagli agenti governativi, per assicurarsi
che nessuna forza ostile si installi lungo il confine o in Afghanistan; chi si
oppone ai talebani viene sommariamente giustiziato.
– L’India, che ha aperto consolati
a Jalalabad e Qnadahar, presso il confine pachistano preoccupa il Pakistan che
l’accusa di fomentare disordini nel Balucistan, dove è in corso la
quinta rivolta dalla sua incorporazione nel 1947.
– Il
generale Musharraf accusa il governo afgano di essere nelle mani dei tajiki, (quel
che rimane degli ufficiali dell’Alleanza
del Nord, che vennero appoggiati da Iran, Russia e India durante la sua resistenza
ai talebani, appoggiati dal Pakistan) che marginalizzerebbero i pasthun come il
presidente Garzai e la maggioranza del suo gabinetto e dei governatori provinciali;
un’accusa volta a contrastare l’influenza dell’India.
I dirigenti dei talebani utilizzano le aree del nord
Pakistan (in particolare la città di Quetta, ed alcune autorità tribali) come base
da dove sferrare i loro attacchi in Afghanistan.
Il numero di questi attacchi è triplicato nonostante l’accordo concluso
il 5 settembre (presso l’autorità tribale del Nord Waziristan) tra il governo pakistano di Musharraf,
maggiorenti tribali, mujaheddin, talebani e ulema, che prevede il ritiro nelle
basi dell’esercito pachistano e la cessazione degli attacchi dei guerriglieri in
Afghanistan.
WSJ 061025
A Border Affair
By BARNETT R.
RUBIN
October 25,
2006; Page A14
It will
take more than a dinner at the White House — such as the one held for Pervez Musharraf and Hamid
Karzai last month — to overcome the longstanding antagonism between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Of course, the
political clumsiness on the part of the U.S. does not begin or end there.
Had we paid more attention to pre-9/11 history, we might not face a rising Taliban insurgency with
sanctuary in Pakistan.
U.S., NATO and Afghan intelligence agree
that the Taliban leadership’s safe haven in Pakistan,
especially in the city of Quetta and some tribal
agencies, is essential to the insurgency’s ability to exploit Afghanistan’s
internal weaknesses. Gen. Musharraf admitted in Kabul
on Sept. 7 that while Pakistan
had worked against al Qaeda, "the focus had now shifted to the Taliban."
In other words, Pakistan
had theretofore done nothing to hinder them.
On Sept. 5, Gen. Musharraf’s government signed
an agreement in the North Waziristan tribal agency with tribal elders, local
mujahadeen, Taliban and ulama (Islamic clergy), under which the Pakistani army
would withdraw to bases, and the fighters would end attacks into Afghanistan.
The number of such attacks, however, has tripled since the agreement.
Pakistan has never fully acted on U.S. demands to fight the Taliban, not because
Gen. Musharraf is "against us" rather than "with us," but
because the Pakistan army
sees its interests in a regional context, not as part of the U.S. war on terror. The conflict
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the anomalous status of Pakistan’s tribal
areas, the contest between Talibanization and Pashtun nationalism in the
borderlands, the struggle over military control of the Pakistani state, and
the refuge for terrorists along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are all linked,
as are the policies that could address these problems.
Except
for the five years of Taliban rule in Kabul, Pakistan and Afghanistan
have had largely hostile relations since Pakistan
was created almost 60 years ago. Even under the Taliban, Afghanistan never accepted the
incorporation of Pashtun and Baluch territories into Pakistan. This dispute had
led Afghanistan’s monarchy
to seek Soviet military aid to counter Pakistan’s
U.S.-aided army, and to align itself diplomatically with India.
Pakistan’s
military has used jihadi militants to accomplish several goals: to wage asymmetrical warfare in Kashmir
and Afghanistan; to spread Islamism among Pashtuns on both sides of
the border to counter Pashtun and Baluch nationalists who it feared
would break up the country; and to cement its alliance with Islamist parties,
whose street power intimidates and marginalizes the centrist parties that
have dominated fair elections in Pakistan. The Pashtun tribal agencies (known
as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or FATA), play a key role in
this strategy: The absence of national administration or political institutions
creates a space where Islamist militias can organize and train, while
the Pakistani state denies responsibility for it.
Pakistan‘s rulers depict these tribal areas
as repositories of ancient traditions, but they are actually relics of
colonialism. In 1901, Lord Curzon, viceroy of India, promulgated the Frontier
Crimes Regulations under which FATA is still run. The "tribal
elders" of whom Gen. Musharraf speaks are not representatives of
traditional society, but objects of manipulation by the government’s
"political agents," who wield slush funds with no accountability.
Elders who oppose the Taliban are summarily executed. Such murders are
so common that the term used for them, "target killings," was incorporated
in English into the Urdu-language text of the Waziristan
agreement. Two of these supposedly banned killings took place within a week
after the agreement was signed.
Pakistan thus pursues the goal, inherited
from the British Empire, of using violence and manipulation to assure that
no hostile forces gain a foothold along the border, or in Afghanistan. The main force that concerns
Pakistan is India, which has opened consulates in Jalalabad
and Qandahar, near the Pakistan
border. Pakistan charges
that Indian intelligence uses agents to spy on and destabilize Pakistan, for instance by fomenting unrest in
Baluchistan, where Islamabad
faces the fifth insurgency since its government incorporated the area in
1947.
Gen. Musharraf’s
ethnic charges — that the Afghan government is dominated by Tajiks who
marginalize Pashtuns like President Karzai and the majority of his cabinet and
provincial governors — are linked to the goal of purging Afghanistan of Indian
influence. By "Tajiks," Gen. Musharraf means the remaining officials
(head of the intelligence agency and army chief of staff) from the Northern
Alliance faction that received aid from Iran,
Russia and, worst of all, India,
during its resistance to the Pakistani-supported Taliban. At last month’s
White House dinner, President Karzai refuted these erroneous ethnic charges,
while President Bush pointed out that the U.S.,
not India,
is supporting the Afghan military and intelligence services.
This
archaic border arrangement has created a space for Pakistan to allow militant parties
and former intelligence agents to support the Taliban. Firm pressure to shut
down the Taliban command and control must be accompanied by efforts to support
democracy and civilian rule in Pakistan,
which would empower the centrist and nonsectarian parties that have actually
won elections in Pakistan.
Democratization should be extended to the tribal areas, where political parties
are now outlawed, giving radical militias a political monopoly. Several
mainstream Pakistani parties have proposed such reforms.
The U.S. and Afghanistan should also recognize
legitimate Pakistani concerns. The sizes of Indian consulates should be
limited, and the U.S, Afghanistan
and India
should agree to confidence-building measures about their roles. Once Pakistan acts against Taliban sanctuaries,
President Karzai should also take the courageous and politically difficult step
to initiate a political dialogue in both Afghanistan and across the border
over resolution of all outstanding issues, including the recognition of an open
border between the two countries. In return, landlocked Afghanistan will need
guaranteed access to Pakistani port facilities.
The U.S.
and other NATO countries would have to act as guarantors of this process and
provide aid to develop the border area, where unemployment and illiteracy
facilitate recruitment to armed groups. These policies would address the roots
of instability and violence in this region, and make those on both sides of the
frontier genuine partners in protecting both their own security, and ours.
Mr. Rubin
is director of studies and senior fellow at the Center on International
Cooperation, New York
University.