– Erbil, capital del Kurdistan iracheno, opera di fatto come Stato indipendente, con un proprio potere legislativo, esecutivo e giudiziario; ha il totale controllo dei confine esterni e di quelli regionali, interni.
– È la prima volta nella storia che i curdi hanno uno proprio Stato, semindipendente.
– Risulta di fatto fuori dallo Stato iracheno, non avendo un reale potere decisionale perché dispone di soli 90 seggi su un totale di 700 al parlamento centrale.
– Il Kurdistan, il più recente “petro-stato”, ha vissuto un periodo di stabilità politica ed economica dalla fine della guerra del Golfo nel 1991; la sua economia è in crescita diversamente da quella del resto dell’Iraq.
– Il potere politico è detenuto in gran parte dalla famiglia del presidente Massoud Barzani, che discende da una dinastia che si è imposta nel corso di secoli;
– suo padre guidò le rivolte degli anni Sessanta e Settanta contro Hussein.
– Barzani è un autocrate non molto diverso da quello dei vari regimi di Nord Africa e Medio Oriente che stanno crollando sotto la pressione della “primavera araba”.
– La rivoluzione del 1991 a Erbil contro le truppe di Hussein venne condotta e vinta dalla popolazione, poi la milizia Peshmerga scese dai monti e rivendicò il potere.
– Il clan di Barzani – che gode di forte popolarità nella sua area politica in Nord Iraq – è contestato politicamente, come pure il potere del KPD (Partito Democratico curdo), poco tollerante verso le critiche e denunce di corruzione da parte dell’opposizione.
– Uno dei maggiori argomenti di critica è il coinvolgimento del clan nell’economia petrolifera del Kurdistan:
– la ricchezza personale di Barzani è stimata sui $2MD, ma non è conosciuta quella della famiglia, per opacità legale e per la presenza di una rete estera di enti a proprietà incrociata,
o ma è lasciata supporre dalla alcuni episodi riguardanti i familiari, come la perdita di oltre $3,2 mn. in un casino di Dubai subita dal figlio Mansur, o l’acquisto di una casa in Virginia per $10 mn. da parte dell’altro figlio Masrour, entrambi ufficialmente vivrebbero di modesti “salari” statali:
– Masrour dirige i servizi segreti, che non disdegnano la repressione violenta delle proteste come accaduto nel 201 a Erbil, Halabja e Sulaymaiyah.
– Il clan Barzani mantiene la propria influenza nella classe dirigente, alla quale vengono riconosciute prebende e status symbol; il simbolo dell’élite del KPD è una flotta di auto sportive bianche. Fonte di diffusa corruzione, malgoverno e di risentimento popolare sono gli introiti petroliferi ufficiali e quelli che non finiscono nei forzieri del governo e del partito,
– mentre sono appariscenti le contraddizioni sociali con fasce di estrema povertà.
– Dove finiscono gli introiti petroliferi? Essi sono fonte di un crescente divario sociale ricchi-poveri, permangono forti carenze nei servizi ospedalieri e sanitari, in presenza di una selvaggia edificazione di vistosi monumenti, ricchi centri commerciali, edifici pubblici, e abitazioni di lusso recintate per le élite. È noto che i grandi progetti edilizi sono in qualche modo connessi con i Barzani, che hanno un potere chiave della concessione di permessi. (Sono state anche riprodotte curiosità architettoniche completamente scollegate con la realtà socio-economica locale, come una Royal City, un English Village, un American Village, Italian City etc.)
– Benché il Kurdistan esporti oltre 150mila b/g di petrolio, importa contemporaneamente oltre l’80% del combustibile da Iraq, Iran e Turchia.
– Il KPD e il partito avversario, PUK (Unione Patriottica del Kurdistan, il partito dell’attuale presidente iracheno Jalal Talabani) hanno creato meccanismi intrecciati di distribuzione ed esecuzione del potere, per cui sono entrambi di fatto al potere, con qualche leggero squilibrio temporaneo a favore di uno o dell’altro.
– I Barzani e il PUK di Talabani posseggono i settori più redditizi in Kurdistan, quello società di telefonia mobile, centri commerciali, affari petroliferi in nero. Nessuno sa dove finiscano gli introiti petroliferi (Ari, editore della pubblicazione Ekurd.net, con sede in Austria).
– Nel caso del clan Barzani il denaro rafforza gli antichi legami e fedeltà tribali, rendendo possibile una “democraticità della dinastia Barzani.
Molti dei governi occidentali hanno un loro consolato a Erbil e conoscono bene le ingiustizie socio-politiche, che preferiscono ignorare per l’avidità di profitti derivanti dal petrolio e da un mercato di consumo in crescita.
Family rule taints Kurdistan’s rise
By Derek Monroe
– A haze hangs low over the city of Erbil. Automotive exhaust and dry sand envelop the area, forming an opaque mixture that sunshine struggles to penetrate. The capital of northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Autonomous Region, Erbil operates as a de facto independent state, with its own legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Its soldiers wear their uniforms with pride, sporting a tricolor symbol of their country sewn on to them. Meanwhile, Erbil has total control of its external and internal regional borders, just as any sovereign state would.
– As a result, Erbil is separate from Iraq, and from that country’s contentious and often deadly politics in Baghdad. "Separation is a necessary step, as our representatives have only 90 seats in Iraq’s parliament [out of 700 plus]. Thus we have absolutely no voice in what is going on," said Abdullah, who owns a travel agency in downtown Erbil. "They often say we will give you money for this and this, but we want you to do this and that," he added. "We, the Kurds, find this unacceptable, as so many people have died so things will not be the same as before anymore."
– The sentiment Abdullah expresses prevails among Kurds who are now, for the first time in history, living in a state they can call their own. As the newest petro-state, Kurdistan has enjoyed an unprecedented level of political and economic stability since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991. And for the first time, the Iraqi Kurds’ economic fortunes are on an upward trend, especially in comparison with their co-patriots in neighboring countries, as a sea of oil revenue has lifted most economic boats.
– Yet not all is well in Kurdistan, due in part to the dominant presence of one ruling family. Descended from a political dynasty that has built a power base over centuries of fighting, regional president Massoud Barzani has blossomed into an authoritarian ruler not unlike many whose regimes are now crumbling from the internal pressures of the Arab Spring.
Organized corruption
– Throughout Erbil, portraits of Barzani adorn the walls of offices and shops. That is not to say that Barzani’s cult of personality is as force-fed as Saddam Hussein’s often was in Iraq. The Barzani clan has tremendous popularity in the area of its political base in northern Iraq, and people feel a genuine reverence for Massoud, whose father led uprisings against Hussein in the 1960s and 1970s.
– However, the cracks in the family’s image are accentuated by political dissent, and the official story of the ruling Kurdish Democratic Party’s (KDP) road to power has often been challenged. "The people were the ones who first fought in the city and defeated Hussein’s troops in 1991’s revolution," said Adar, who runs a small hotel downtown. "The Peshmerga [militia] came down two days later from the mountains after it was all over and claimed the power. This is the truth that many people in Erbil are afraid to speak of," he said.
– The fear to speak out is real, as KDP has both limited tolerance for criticism and a long memory. In December 2005, Kamal Qadir, an Austrian scholar, was arrested and sentenced to 30 years in prison for a series of articles criticizing the Barzanis’ hold on the economy and power. He was released a year later after prolonged action to free him by Amnesty International and the Austrian government.
– However, Kurdish journalists Soran Mama Hama and Sardasht Osman were not so lucky; they were gunned down for writing about corruption by the political class and local governments. Demands for thorough and transparent investigations were met by Kurdish authorities maneuvering to blame others for the deaths; to this day both cases remain unsolved.
– Even a brief expression of criticism toward the Barzanis, such as one anonymous caller’s comments on a television call-in program, resulted in a bombing of the studio the very next day. As usual, the perpetrators were never found.
– One of the most sensitive subjects is the Barzanis’ involvement in the economy of the newly rich oil state. While Massoud Barzani’s personal wealth is estimated to be in the range of US$2 billion, the exact amount of the family’s involvement is unknown due to Kurdistan’s murky legal environment and a web of offshore cross-ownership entities.
– While the Barzanis often repudiate any reporting that follows the trail of money, such as a 2010 exposure by the newspaper Rozhnama that accused them of benefiting from illegal oil smuggling, the personal behavior of some family members leads to more questions than answers.
– For example, in 2012, Mansur Barzani, the son of Massoud, lost over $3.2 million in a Dubai casino during the elder Barzani’s official state visit. Meanwhile the other son, Masrour, purchased a $10 million home in the US state of Virginia.
– Officially, they were both living on modest government salaries – with Masrour heading the security and intelligence services, which are not shy to use deadly force to squash protests they find intolerable, as was demonstrated in 2011 in Erbil, Halabja, and Sulaymaniyah.
– The family’s influence permeates the ruling class through a steady supply of official perks and status symbols. The symbol of the KDP elite has become a fleet of white sport utility vehicles that ply the pot-holed streets of Erbil at high speeds, unconcerned about pedestrians or other vehicles. Official and unofficial oil revenues streaming into governmental and party coffers compound a growing resentment over widespread corruption and mismanagement.
– Signs of extreme poverty compete with these images of imported luxury goods. The contrast is easily visible at the grand bazaar in front of Erbil’s famous citadel. Women carrying small children sell chewing gum to passersby in order to retain what remains of their dignity. "Life is very hard here," said a woman holding a toddler. She declined to give her name as she approached me. "You wouldn’t know it because you are not from here. But believe me, every day of my life is bitter."
– The KDP and its historical rival, the Patriotic Union[e] of Kurdistan (PUK), have created interlocking mechanisms of power distribution and execution that put both of them in the driver’s seat at the same time.
– The balance is often altered slightly in favor of one or the other party, depending on the individual at the helm. In the Barzani clan’s case, the money trail reinforces ancient tribal allegiances and connections, making a de-facto "democratic" Barzani dynasty possible.
– The dysfunction of organized corruption is most visible in economic sphere. "The Barzanis and [current Iraqi President Jalal] Talabani’s PUK own most of the lucrative businesses in Mobile phones, big shopping malls, non-transparent oil deals Kurdistan.
– No one exactly knows where the oil income goes," said Ari, editor of Austria-based publication Ekurd.net. The degree of rapacity at the expense of the public interest is often taken to grotesque proportions. In one example, a party-dominated cell phone company made huge profits by charging enormous sums for SIM cards, even when cell phone reception didn’t work.
A state of schizophrenia
– Large amounts of petro-dollars coming into the economy are increasingly resulting not only in a growing divide between rich and poor, but also a national state of schizophrenia with curious contradictions. "Having a look at the hospitals and their services, which are very poor, one cannot help but say ‘where does the oil income go?’" said Ari. "Despite exporting over 150,000 barrels per day, Kurdistan is still importing over 80% of the fuel it needs from Iraq, Iran, and Turkey."
– The Barzanis tout break-neck land development and new construction as a monument to Kurdish independence, with new malls, shops, public buildings, and homes popping up everywhere.
– The mass construction along the "100-Meter" ring road in Erbil is creating a Nevada-like environment of gated hamlets for educated elites and expatriate foreigners. It is widely understood that any major building project has to have some type of business connection with the Barzanis, who are pivotal to the permitting process. Their involvement decides whether the construction will be a commercial success or an utter failure.
– The rapid construction of this new Kurdistan results in architectural curiosities. The micro-climate of the West is often replicated in mass real estate offerings that have nothing to do with social and economic realities on the ground. Colonies like Royal City, English Village, American Village, and others, along with the wholesale import of fast-food restaurants, have absolutely nothing to do with local culture or people. This disconnect also extends to parts of government. For example, the foreign affairs office is conveniently located next to a foreign settlement called Italian City, thus making the trip downtown to witness the uncomfortable truth unnecessary.
– According to the 2012 report on Erbil from Associates for International Research, Inc, "The distance from the center to the outermost ring [100m Street] is approximately 2.5 miles [four kilometers]. However, there is little need for expatriates to venture into the center of town, since most expatriate shopping outlets and housing compounds are located along or near 100m Street, or the outer ring. The Ainkawa neighborhood, or Christian quarter, is located in the north of the city."
As one Western NGO worker who preferred to remain anonymous commented, "This is the effect of globalization, parachuted by nuts and bolts into Iraq, and is as magical as Walt Disney’s or Universal Studios’ version of life in that part of the world. All that is missing is Ali Baba and The 40 Thieves, but even this can arranged."
Many Kurds sigh in resignation that this is a symbol of the Barzanis’ rule and expect it to continue without interruption. This is one possibility, but others are harder to predict.
– A member of parliament in Iraq’s ruling party recently accused the Kurds of seeking to partition Iraq along ethnic lines and warned that the government in Baghdad would not tolerate it. Many Kurds are increasingly seeing themselves as caught between a rock (their government) and a hard place (Baghdad). "Prime Minister [Nuri al-] Maliki is a little Saddam. He will not stop in getting all of Iraq’s lands together as before. He will also come here, but he knows that Kurds will fight hard. We have no other choice," said Adar, who works at the grand bazaar in the center of Erbil.
– It would be a stretch to think that Western governments remain unaware of Kurdistan’s power dynamics. Many of them have consulates in Erbil, where developments are constantly being monitored and reported on. Yet the race to profit from oil and tap a growing consumer market pushes other considerations – such as human rights and the application of democratic principles – into not even the backseat, but as far back as the trunk of a speeding car with Kurdish license plates. The ultimate tolls on this highway to prosperity will be paid not by the driver but by its passengers, the Kurds, with growing evidence that the final destination is different from what had been advertised.
Derek Monroe is a contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus.
(Posted with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus.)
Skis replace bullets in Iraqi Kurdistan (Apr 18, ’13)
– I piani turchi per l’acquisto di petrolio e gas del Kurdistan iracheno
[1] hanno aperto il dibattito, soprattutto da parte americana, sul rischio che la Turchia miri a una divisione del territorio iracheno;
– la Casa Bianca si trova divisa tra l’appoggio alle aspirazioni dell’alleato turco e il timore che il riconoscimento di maggiori poteri al governo semi-autonomo del Kurdistan apra un conflitto con il primo ministro Nouri al-Maliki, gli Usa non vogliono che si crei un precedente che consenta ai vari governi regionali di stringere accordi autonomi sulle risorse, cosa che destabilizzerebbe il governo, in una fase in cui in Iraq stanno montando gli scontri settari.
– Una portavoce del National Security Council: “Gli Usa non appoggiano esportazioni di petrolio da nessuna regione dell’Iraq senza l’adeguato consenso del governo federale iracheno”.
– L’accordo energetico inserisce la Turchia nello scontro tra il Governo regionale del Kurdistan iracheno e quello centrale, dello sciita Nouri al-Maliki, sugli introiti petroliferi, e su una divisione federale dei poteri.
– Erdogan ha dichiarato che la Turchia appoggia la posizione curda sulla questione del petrolio (il governo del Kurdistan sostiene che la Costituzione irachena dia al Kurdistan il diritto di siglare nuovi contratti, mentre quello centrale mantiene il diritto si vecchi contratti; Baghdad invece considera illegali gli accordi firmati da Erbil); ha sottolineato che vari paesi stanno cercando di entrare nel settore petrolifero di varie regioni dell’Iraq.
– Le dichiarazioni di Erdogan sono risultate in contraddizione con la politica finora sostenuta dalla Turchia: integrità territoriale dell’Iraq, NO ad accordi che possano minarne la stabilità.
– L’accordo potrebbe (NB art. scritti a maggio 2013) favorire i negoziati di pace tra governo turco di Erdogan e i curdi turchi, in conflitto da 30 anni, accrescere l’influenza di Ankara nel Nord Irak (oltre che soddisfare il suo accresciuto fabbisogno energetico), e aprire al petrolio del Kurdistan i mercati internazionali.
– Ma il futuro dell’Iraq dipende dal futuro dell’area, dal rischio di una sua frammentazione, anche di fronte al rischio di disintegrazione della Siria,
– dove il conflitto ha liberato la regione curda di N-E, cosa che ha spinto la Turchia a fare pace con i propri curdi e inserito i curdi iracheni e siriani in una “Turcosfera” economicamente dinamica.
– È in gioco il sistema di Stati seguito un secolo fa all’impero ottomano in Siria e Mesopotamia, creato dalle macchinazioni di Francia e GB, che hanno ritagliato dall’impero ottomano aree arabe riunendole poi secondo i loro calcoli (1916, Accodo Sykes-Picot) e poi modificato dalla guerra anglo-americana nel 2003 che ha scardinato il sistema statale e la società dell’Irak.
– L’assetto creato da Francia e GB porta la responsabilità di aver riunito in Iraq sotto il dominio sunnita, curdi e sciiti, di aver favorito un cambio di minoranze in Siria, di aver staccato il Libano controllato da cristiani maroniti dalla maggioranza sunnita di Siria.
– L’invasione e l’occupazione dell’Iraq, con il potere assegnato ad una maggioranza sciita, insolita in un paese arabo, ha posto fine ad un equilibrio di potere tra sunniti e sciiti durato quasi un millennio. Lo scontro sciiti-sunniti è un potente fattore degli eventi in atto.
– In Siria la frammentazione è accelerata dalla debolezza di entrambe le parti:
– i ribelli sunniti, maggioranza litigiosa, hanno protettori diversi, Qatar e Arabia Saudita, a maggioranza sunnita, hanno piani diversi;
– il sostegno limitato dell’Occidente ha rafforzato gli islamisti radicali.
– E Assad fa sempre più affidamento sulle milizie.
– Oltre ad un Kurdistan allargato, che la Turchia cerca di allearsi, stanno emergendo altre due entità de facto:
– una è la regione Jazeera, tra Eufrate e Tigri, che collega i sunniti dell’Iraq occidentale con i sunniti della Siria orientale, spesso legati d vincoli tribali.
– la seconda è una area alawita sulla costa e sulle montagne interne nel N-E della Siria; se Hezbollah riesce a liberare la strada per il regime Assad tra Homes e il confine libanese, questa enclave potrebbe riuscire a collegarsi con le roccaforti sciite della valle della Bekaa in Libano.
Steve LeVine
– La ridefinizione dell’assetto di due importanti elementi del Medio Oriente che sembrava preannunciarsi
– curdi della regione à maggiore autonomia;
– Israele in procinto di avere un gasdotto per esportare il suo gas naturale.
– è messa in discussione dalle rivolte in Turchia contro il primo ministro Erdogan, principale protagonista di entrambi gli eventi, che rientrano nella strategia di espansione dell’influenza della Turchia.
– L’iniziativa curda di Erdogan è comparsa pubblicamente nell’aprile 2011, con la sua visita a Erbil, la prima di un rappresentante politico turco nella regione, dopo decenni di violenta repressione della propria popolazione curda da parte di Iran, Iraq, Siria e Turchia. Dopo sei mesi la firma di un accordo di esplorazione petrolifera …
– accordo che ha provocato tensioni politiche con Baghdad, accusata di aiutare i curdi iracheni ad avere un’indipendenza economica, partendo dalla costruzione di oleodotti e gasdotti; l’accordo con i curdi iracheni comportava anche una tregua con il PKK, partito del movimento curdo in Turchi.
– L’annuncio del 14 maggio 2013, di Erdogan che il gruppo statale petrolifero turco, Turkiye Petrolleri AO, si allea con Exxon per il contratto del Kurdistan,
– fa sì che i vantaggi economici della Turchia divengano uno snodo centrale delle mire secessionistiche del Kurdistan.
– Le esportazioni di greggio dal Kurdistan al porto turco di Merson, iniziate a gennaio, solo di oltre 40 000 b/g; previsti 60 000 b/g per la fine di giugno.
– Secondo Ross Wilson, ex ambasciatore Usa in Turchia e ora capo della divisione eurasiatica del Consiglio Atlantico) Le rivolte di piazza Taksim – pur non essendosi ancora occupate della politica estera di Erdogan, tranne che per l’appoggio dato ai ribelli siriani, compromettono sia la riconciliazione con i curdi turchi che gli sviluppi petroliferi nel Kurdistan iracheno.
– Washington ha ammonito Erdogan di smetterla di appoggiare i curdi; Erdogan è fondamentale perché siano realizzati gli oleodotti e gasdotti dal Kurdistan verso la Turchia, elementi chiave per l’esportazione e quindi per l’indipendenza economica e politica della regione.
– Ora i progetti per gli oleodotti sono in stallo …
– Sembrano scarse anche le possibilità di costruzione del gasdotto verso la Turchia dai giacimenti offshore israeliani, con riserve pari a 5 miliardi di petrolio equivalente, sufficienti per il fabbisogno israeliano per decenni e per esportarlo. Senza la Turchia le alternative sono troppo costose (gasdotto sottomarino verso la Grecia e impianto per la liquefazione).
– Il gasdotto fu bloccato da Erdogan per l’incidente del 2010 (attacco israeliano contro navi di ONG verso Gaza, con 9 morti turchi).
– ————————-
PressTV, 130514
– Michael Rubin del Think Tank americano, American Enterprise Institute (AEI), (10.05.2013), incoraggia il Governo regionale del Kurdistan iracheno (KRG) a dimostrarsi capace di gestire uno Stato indipendente per conquistarsi l’appoggio di Washington contro Baghdad.
– Washington non appoggerebbe perché il KRG non è capace di preporre la questione statale alle risse interne e alle relazioni famigliari; il KRG dovrebbe nominare un rappresentante carismatico per dirigere l’ufficio curdo a Washington; il presidente Masud Barzani non è indispensabile.
– Gli introiti petroliferi del KRG, il crescente controllo del DUP su gran parte del Kurdistan siriano e la recente pace della Turchia con il PKK sarebbero i fattori che facilitano l’indipendenza del Kurdistan.
– Rubin ricorda che il vice-presidente Usa, Biden, propose un piano di divisione dell’Iraq in tre regioni, sunnita, sciita e curda.
– Dati questi presupposti, Rubin si attende che diversi ex funzionari Usa, “che hanno molti interessi nel petrolio del Kurdistan, appoggino il KRG contro Baghdad.
Financial Times
Global Insight
May 19, 2013 3:55 pm
Turkey-Kurdish oil deal reflects end of post-Ottoman order
By David Gardner in London
Ankara diplomats prepare for possible break-up of bits of the Middle East, says David Gardner
– Confirmation last week that Turkey plans to buy into the oil and gas wealth of the self-governing Kurdish region of northern Iraq has led to warnings – most stridently from the US – that Ankara is gambling with the break-up of Iraq. Indeed. But there is more at stake than that. Drop a rock in any pool in this febrile region – now hyperconnected in all the wrong ways – and the ripples will reach every shore.
– In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government and the national authorities in Baghdad are nowhere near a pact for sharing the country’s potentially huge oil revenues, much less a working model of federal power-sharing – with the Baghdad government of Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia Islamist aligned with Iran, invariably favouring sect and faction above state and nation.
– But the future of Iraq is now just part of a discussion about the possible break-up of bits of the Middle East, given new urgency by the disintegration of Syria under the pulverising effect of two years of civil war.
– That conflict has prised loose the Kurdish region of northeast Syria, galvanising Turkey into making peace with its own Kurds and drawing Iraqi and Syrian Kurds into an economically dynamic Turkosphere.
– That this debate is only just starting suggests just how problematic it is – and how immense its possible consequences. What is in play is the state system that succeeded the Ottoman Empire almost a century ago in Syria and Mesopotamia.
– One of the problems with this debate is where you start the clock. Must one begin with the machinations of Britain and France, who carved up the Ottoman Empire’s Arab possessions and reassembled them according to their own imperial designs and ambitions, most infamously in the Sykes-Picot stitch-up of 1916?
– Or with the 2003 Anglo-American war of choice in Iraq that shattered a fragile country as a society and state?
– The Franco-British, post-Ottoman order bears a historic share of responsibility. Where the most acute stress lines are now, the UK and France bolted together Kurds and Shia under a Sunni minority in Iraq; backed a rotation of minorities in Syria; and broke off Lebanon under Maronite Christian rule from Sunni majority Syria (the management of Palestine merits separate discussion).
– The invasion and occupation of Iraq, by empowering a rare Shia majority in an Arab heartland country, upended a regional balance of power between Sunni and Shia Muslims that had held for nearly a millennium. The Sunni-Shia contest, which has now collided violently in Syria with the upheavals of the so-called Arab Spring, is the most powerful driver of what is now happening.
– In Syria, fragmentation is accelerated by weakness on both sides. Fractious, majority Sunni rebels have different patrons – notably Sunni powers such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia with different agendas – while limited support from the west has meant radical Islamists have become disproportionately powerful. The crumbling Assad regime, built around the heterodox Shia Alawite minority, relies more and more on militias – an intrinsically cantonal and sectarian form of warfare.
– So, in addition to the enlarged Kurdistan Turkey is trying to embrace, there are at least two other de facto entities starting to emerge.
– One is the Jazeera region between the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, linking up the disaffected Sunni of western Iraq with their often tribally related coreligionists in eastern Syria. Bashar al-Assad’s sponsoring of a jihadi pipeline into occupied Iraq 10 years ago has blown back on him – now that the same networks have found the way back into Syria.
– A second is the Alawite coastal and mountain heartland in northwest Syria. If Hizbollah, the Iran-backed Lebanese Shia paramilitary movement, succeeds in clearing a path for the Assads between Homs and the Lebanese border, this enclave could end up connected to Shia strongholds in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. And so on. Pull a string here, and it will unravel there.
– It is hard to know what the right response to this is, but it is probably not to lecture the Turks, whose foreign policy at bottom follows the money rather than the flag, and has an underlying (and European-influenced) belief in “soft borders” across former Ottoman lands. A lot to discuss then, and the worst imaginable time to discuss it.
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Turkey agrees Kurdish north Iraq energy deal
– ISTANBUL—A Turkish state-run oil firm struck a deal with Exxon Mobil Corp. and Iraq’s semiautonomous Kurds to develop projects in northern Iraq, Turkey’s leader said Tuesday, an agreement fraught with political risks for the energy-rich region.
– The deal thrust Turkey into a long-standing feud between Iraq’s central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government over who has rights to northern Iraq’s vast oil resources and raised tensions with Baghdad, which called it illegal.
– The deal could help underpin a peace accord that Turkey is negotiating to end a three-decade conflict with its own Kurdish population as it enters a delicate phase, analysts say. It could also help Turkey meet rising energy demand and raise Ankara’s sway in northern Iraq.
– Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s announcement came two days before he was scheduled to meet in Washington with President Barack Obama, whose administration has frowned on deals that lack Baghdad’s approval.
– The White House is caught between a desire to support the aspirations of Turkey, a Washington ally, and trepidation that empowering regional Iraqi authorities like the Kurds could alienate Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who is seeking to extend Baghdad’s influence across the divided country.
– U.S. officials also fear setting a precedent to let regional governments strike independent resource deals could destabilize Mr. Maliki’s government during a time when sectarian violence in Iraq is mounting.
– The Obama administration, which in the past months brokered negotiations between Ankara and Baghdad, called for talks between Iraq’s central government and the regional Kurdish government to resolve the issue.
– "Our position on energy trade from Iraq has been consistent and remains unchanged: The United States doesn’t support oil exports from any part of Iraq without the appropriate approval of the federal Iraqi government," said Caitlin Hayden, a spokeswoman for the National Security Council.
– There is a deep divide between the Kurds and Baghdad over how to interpret Iraq’s constitution in regards to oil rights. The Kurds maintain that it gives them the right to grant new contracts while letting the central government manage existing licenses. Mr. Maliki contends that Baghdad’s approval is needed for all agreements.
– In his announcement, Mr. Erdogan emphasized that Turkey backs the Kurds’ position and that Turkey can pursue deals directly with the Erbil-based Kurdistan Regional Government, in this case through Turkiye Petrolleri AO, Turkey’s state news agency Anatolia said.
– "Countries from various parts of the world are taking steps to explore and produce oil in different parts of Iraq, and then deliver it to world oil markets," Mr. Erdogan said. "There’s nothing more normal, more natural than Turkey, which provides all kinds of support and aid to its next-door neighbor, to take a step that is based on mutual benefit."
Baghdad held firm to its position. "The deal is illegal and is not in line with the Iraqi constitution," said Faisal Abdullah, spokesman for Hussein al-Shahristani, Iraq’s deputy prime minister for energy. "Any agreement signed without the approval of the central government is illegal."
Exxon Mobil declined to comment. The Kurdish Regional Government didn’t comment.
– Oil rights and political autonomy was one of the issues discussed on April 30 when representatives of the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan Regional Government held talks. Kurdish representatives characterized the talks as an early step in a long process of settling relations between Baghdad and Erbil.
– Some analysts said Tuesday’s announcement was a surprise because it contrasted sharply with Ankara’s stated policy. Turkish officials have consistently called for the territorial integrity of Iraq and reiterated that they wouldn’t pursue any deal that would undermine the country’s stability.
– Striking an agreement with Ankara offers Iraq’s Kurds a gateway to export its huge reserves of crude oil directly to world markets via Turkey through a new pipeline it hopes to build. Most of the region’s oil is normally sold domestically.
– Aside from U.S. oil major Exxon Mobil, Chevron Corp. and smaller explorers like Turkey-based Genel Energy PLC, run by former BP BP.LN -0.75% PLC chief Tony Hayward, are working in northern Iraq.
—Keith Johnson, Joe Parkinson, Hassan Hafidh, Ali Abbas and Tom Fowler contributed to this article.
Write to Emre Peker at emre.peker@dowjones.com
How Turkey’s chaos has undercut Kurdish and Israeli oil and gas ambitions
By Steve LeVine
Until a few days ago, there seemed to be an inexorable reordering of two major swaths of the Middle East. The region’s Kurds seemed on the cusp of achieving greater political autonomy, and Israel appeared to be at least potentially on its way to obtaining an export pipeline for its natural gas. But Turkey’s now five-day-old protests—which intensified today when unionized public workers called an anti-government strike—seem likely to disrupt both of these trends.
– The reason: Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the target of the demonstrators, is an architect and an essential political actor in both the Kurdish and Israeli shakeups, part of a strategy of expanding Turkey’s influence abroad. But rather than pushing along these aims, Erdogan seems bound to spend weeks or months distracted by domestic unrest, which also threatens his ambition to change the constitution and win re-election as president next year.
– Erdogan’s Kurdish initiative first attracted attention in April 2011, when he visited Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. He was two years into a campaign to finally resolve a long, bloody conflict with Turkey’s own Kurdish population, which made the Erbil visit—the first of any senior Turkish leader to the northern Iraqi province—highly emotive. For decades, much of the region—Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey—had violently suppressed its restive Kurdish populations. Now Turkey was expressing sympathy for the cultural and political freedoms that the Kurds had long sought.
– Just six months later, the Iraqi Kurds signed an oil exploration deal (paywall) with ExxonMobil.
– Together with Erdogan’s visit, the agreement stirred regional politics: Defying the wishes of Baghdad, Turkey and Exxon would help the Iraqi Kurds establish economic independence, starting with the construction of direct oil and natural gas pipelines. The agreement with the Iraqi Kurds also involved an Erdogan truce with the PKK, the militant Kurdish movement in Turkey.
Two years later, on May 14 of this year, Erdogan announced that Turkey’s state-oil company itself would partner with Exxon in the Kurdistan deal. That put Turkey’s economic benefit at the center of Iraqi Kurdistan’s objective to pull away from Baghdad.
– The protests in Istanbul’s Taksim Square only weeks later have not yet focused on Erdogan’s foreign policy, apart from voicing the national resentment over his support for Syrian rebels.
– But Ross Wilson, former US ambassador to Turkey and now head of the Eurasian division of the Atlantic Council, says they nonetheless undercut both Erdogan’s reconciliation with Turkish Kurds and the oil developments in Iraqi Kurdistan.
– ExxonMobil declined to comment. But in Iraq, Erdogan’s high-stakes policy flouts both Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Washington, who have warned the Turkish leader to stop backing the Kurds. That makes him a necessary general without whose authority the delicate process will likely stall. His approval is required in particular to push forward the planned construction of dedicated oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, the key to monetizing Iraqi Kurdistan’s natural resources.
– “In order to export substantial quantities of oil, the Iraqi Kurds need the acquiescence of Turkish authorities,” Wilson said. “The pipelines are on hold and will remain on hold.”
– Similarly, there seems little chance of progress on the idea of building a natural gas pipeline from rich offshore Israeli fields to the Turkish market.
– Israel’s eastern Mediterranean fields have the equivalent of 5 billion barrels of oil, sufficient to provide the country energy security for decades, along with a robust flow of export earnings.
– But without Turkey the gas may be bottled up: Experts say that proposed alternatives, including an undersea pipeline to Greece and a liquefied natural gas facility, are too expensive.
But the proposed pipeline had been stalled by Erdogan, who broke off relations with Israel over its 2010 raid on a Turkish flotilla to Gaza that left nine people dead. Erdogan had been demanding an apology as a condition of reopening relations between the two countries. In March, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu called Erdogan with the apology.
– Since then, the two countries have been in talks over reparations, another required step before pushing forward with fully restored relations and movement on the proposed pipeline. But with Erdogan’s attention now focused on Taksim, Israel has no one of decisive authority on the Turkish side to advance the reparations discussion, or the pipeline plans.
The Iraqi government has vowed to take legal action against companies that export crude oil from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region to Turkey.
Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister for Energy Affairs Hussein al-Shahristani said on Friday, “Any oil that is taken out of the country and payments not made to the Iraqi people through the central government is considered to be taking Iraq’s national wealth.”
“There are a number of means the Iraqi government is considering, and any responsible government would have the same priority to protect the wealth of the people,” Shahristani stated.
– Crude exports from the Taq Taq oil field in the Kurdistan region to Turkey’s port city of Mersin have risen to more than 40,000 barrels per day (bpd). The exports, which began in early January, are expected to hit around 60,000 bpd by the end of June.
Ties have soured between Turkey and Iraq over the energy relations between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Shahristani also said Baghdad might take legal action against Ankara over its energy deals with Kurdistan, signed on April 3. The Iraqi official added that exporting oil to Turkey from Kurdistan was an act of smuggling that violated the Iraqi law.
On March 29, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Ankara was negotiating the terms of an energy deal with Kurdistan.
Erdogan defended the deal as a “win-win” agreement for both Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government, claiming that the region had the right to use part of its energy resources with whichever country it wanted.
US encouraging KRG to proclaim independence: US think tank
– The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) must prove its ability to run an independent state in order to win Washington’s support against Baghdad, a US think tank says.
“Not since the second decade of the 20th century has the Kurdish dream of independence appeared so attainable,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI) researcher Michael Rubin wrote in an article published on May 10.
– Rubin referred to the KRG’s oil revenues following the downfall of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, the Democratic Union[e] Party’s growing domination over much of Syrian Kurdistan amid the foreign-fueled crisis in the country, and Turkey’s recent peace deal with Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as major factors paving the way for the independence of Iraqi Kurdistan.