Una nuova bilancia del terrore nel Medio Oriente/L’alta posta in gioco nella partita di Netanyahu nella Striscia

Mo, Israele, Palestinesi, potenze
Asia Times      121121

Una nuova bilancia del terrore nel Medio Oriente

Kaveh L Afrasiabi
+ Asia Times   121119
La Crisi di Gaza deve ancora arrivare
+ Asia Times   12119

L’alta posta in gioco nella partita di Netanyahu nella Striscia

Ramzy Baroud

–       Dalla guerra Israele-Palestinesi durata una settimana è emersa una nuova “bilancia del terrore”:

o   diversamente dalla guerra del 2009, in cui Hamas disponeva di missili a raggio più corto, in questa guerra si è vista una brigata missili più disciplinata e sofisticata che ha circa 15 000 soldati, operanti tramite una rete di gallerie.

o   La nuova bilancia del terrore rimane molto asimmetrica a favore di Israele, ma offre maggiori possibilità per una offerta di pace più rilevante. Il fattore di cambiamento è la capacità di Hamas di colpire il territorio di Israele più in profondità, che aumenterà sicuramente nei prossimi anni. Era da 20 anni che non venivano lanciati missili verso il cuore di Israele, dall’Irak di Saddam Hussein nella prima guerra del Golfo. Richiamati 75 000 soldati israeliani, +40% dei militari attivi.

o   L’operazione militare israeliana “Difesa Pilastro”, è stata diretta soprattutto contro i missili a lungo raggio forniti dall’Iran. (23 ott. contro la fabbrica di armi di Yarmouk, e poi l’assassinio mirato del comandante militare palestinese al-Jarbari) (Stratfor, 16 ott. ’12)

o   Gli esperti militari israeliani ne sono consapevoli, non altrettanto i politici.

o   Senza una invasione vera e propria e la rioccupazione di Gaza, Israele non può difendersi del tutto dai missili di Hamas.

–       Hamas ha posto come condizione per una tregua la revoca del blocco israeliano a Gaza, richiesta sostenuta dalla comunità internazionale – nonostante i ripetuti bombardamenti israeliani, con la morte e il ferimento di centinaia di civili a Gaza, descritta da Noam Chomsky come la più grande prigione all’aperto del mondo, in cui gli abitanti vivono in condizioni terribili, a causa della punizione collettiva decretata da Israele contro la gente governata da Hamas.

–       Israele ha uno scudo (“iron dome”) di intercettazione antimissilistico, capace di intercettare circa il 60% dei missili in arrivo, ma oggi mostra una vulnerabilità mai dimostrata, ben distante all’“invincibilità” proclamata dai suoi politici.

o   Obiettivo di Israele è la divisione di Gaza, forse di separare il più possibile il collegamento di Gaza con l’Egitto, da dove è chiaro giungono i missili.

–       Sul lungo termine la revoca del blocco renderebbe più ricca Gaza, con minori tensioni derivanti da povertà e mancanza di generi di necessità primari … e più disposta a mantenere la pace,

o   ma i politici israeliani non sanno comprendere a fondo l’interdipendenza e le conseguenze politiche … convinti di poter avere maggiore sicurezza ricorrendo alla violenza contro gli oppositori palestinesi …

–       Le cause più profonde del conflitto attuale: rivalità interne in Israele e in Palestina, e interessi esterni.

o   Il governo egiziano e il presidente Morsi, dei Fratelli Musulmani (FM), sono sotto forte pressione per far raggiungere una tregua, in gioco il trattato di pace Egitto-Israele.

o   I FM sono divisi tra fedeltà a Hamas e stabilità ai confini.

–       Ha un ruolo importante la rivalità Hamas-al Fatah: negli ultimi mesi l’Autorità per la Palestina del presidente Mahmoud Abbas, controllata da al Fatah, ha subito una serie di scacchi, tra cui l’ascesa della FM in Egitto e la legittimizzazione internazionale di Hamas rappresentata dalla recente visita dell’emiro del Qatar nella Striscia di Gaza e di quella annunciata del primo ministro turco.

o   Mentre Abbas stava cercando il riconoscimento dello Stato palestinese da parte dell’Onu, – che significherebbe anche il riconoscimento di statista per se stesso e il consenso tra le masse arabe – la questione è passata improvvisamente nelle mani di Hamas e Israele, entrambi non contenti dei confini del nuovo Stato palestinese sull base delle linee ante-1967 chiesti da Abbas.

o   Hamas vuole tutta la Palestina occupata, Israele spera di annettersi Gerusalemme Est e i maggiori insediamenti della West Bank.

–       L’escalation servirebbe sia ad Hamas che ad Israele per spostare l’attenzione int.le dall’iniziativa di Fatah, presso l’Onu, a se stessi (secondo Ha’aretz).

–       C’è poi la lotta intestina in Hamas, poco conosciuta: Khaled Meshaal, attuale capo di Hamas, potrebbe riconsiderare la rinuncia in precedenza espressa a partecipare alle elezioni interne dato che alcuni dei suoi oppositori sono morti;

o   Meshaal, rivale di Fatah il controllo di Gaza, lo scorso anno aveva avviato un tentativo di conciliazione con Abbas, l’appoggio espresso all’iniziativa presso l’Onu l’ha posto dalla parte dei moderati di Jabari.

–       E c’è la campagna elettorale in Israele, ma in assenza di un risultato positivo la continuazione del le operazioni belliche lo svantaggerebbe; i leader israeliani devono bilanciarsi tra una linea sufficientemente dura per accontentare il proprio elettorato di destra, e sufficientemente morbida per non rompere con l’Egitto e la comunità int.le.

–       Altre tesi:

o   1. con questa guerra Israele mette a prova l’amministrazione del presidente egiziano, Morsi;

o   2. è un duro messaggio all’Iran;

o   3. Israele sta misurando la propria capacità di deterrenza; etc.

–       Sono 4 anni da quando Israele ha rimescolato le carte con un’esibizione di forza: 2008-2009, “operazione piombo fuso”, 22 giorni, oltre 1400 palestinesi morti e oltre 5000 feriti; Israele venne accusato, anche da diverse organizzazioni int.li e dell’Onu, di crimini di guerra e crimini contro l’umanità,

o   ma non venne processato e punito dai tribunali int.li., grazie allo scudo del governo e dei media americani.

o   Si disse che “Piombo fuso” fosse un test per Obama, che si dimostrò all’altezza delle aspettative israeliane, e sostanzialmente non si differenziò dall’Amministrazione di G.W. Bush.

o   Alcuni incidenti hanno guastato le relazioni Usa-Israele: Obama ha nominato un inviato per la pace in MO e chiesto che Israele riprendesse il “processo di pace”;

o   Obama, echeggiato dalla Clinton, ha precisato che l’arresto delle costruzioni negli insediamenti come primo passo necessario per il ritorno ai negoziati. Questa posizione si è in seguito indebolita fino a rovesciarsi.

–       Netanyhau teme che gli Usa non assumano come proprie le priorità della politica estera israeliana. Netanyhau teme di dover pagare il conto nel prossimo mandato Obama, per l’appoggio espresso al candidato rep. Romney, e per aver condannato Obama riguardo al tentativo di aprire negoziati con l’Iran. La sconfitta di Romney fa riflettere Israele, perché è la prima volta che il potere della lobby sionista e dei milioni di $ dei suoi protettori, come il magnate Sheldon Adelson, non è servita a determinare i risultati elettorali di questa portata.

o   Obama è impopolare tra l’elite politica israeliana, e anche nel pubblico; secondo ABC Israele sarebbe l’unico paese al mondo che avrebbe eletto Romney, con un forte margine, invece di Obama.

–       Il mattino presto del 7 nov., appena noti i risultati delle presidenziali Usa, il governo israeliano si mise all’opera, e fece dispiegare l’esercito per causare provocazioni al confine di Gaza.

o   L’8 cercò il casus belli, portando a Gaza carri armati ed elicotteri da guerra.

o   Prima vittima un 12enne che giocava a calcio; reazione dei palestinesi, ma senza danni all’interno di Israele;

o   poi l’escalation …

o   il 12 nov. stava per essere conclusa un’altra tregua tra Israele e le fazioni resistenti, ma il 14 nov. venne assassinato Ahmed Jabari, il leader palestinese di Hamas che aveva accettato il testo della tregua. L’assassinio ha un significato preciso, Israele aveva deciso di spingere i palestinesi ad una guerra.

o   Nei giorni seguenti vennero uccisi decine di palestinesi, molti dei quali civili;

o   i palestinesi ampliano il raggio dei missili vicino a Tel Aviv, e Gerusalemme; 3 israeliani morti.

–       La tempistica della ultima guerra di Gaza, come di quella precedente, è stata scelta anche per far porre la sicurezza di Israele ai primi posti dell’agenda della nuova Amministrazione americana; nessuna amministrazione americana rischierebbe di iniziare il mandato con una guerra aperta contro Israele.

–       Ciò fatto, si può passare ad un’altra escalation contro Iran, Hezbollah, o chiunque Israele consideri suo nemico.

Asia Times      121121

New balance of terror in the Middle East

By Kaveh L Afrasiabi

–          NEW YORK – In the week-long war between Israel and the Palestinians, slowly but surely signs have emerged of a new "balance of terror" reflecting Hamas’s enhanced ability to strike back at Israel via the Iran-made long range Fajr-5 rocket.

–          Compared with the previous war in 2009, when Hamas relied on the shorter range and more inaccurate rockets that rattled southern Israel before a ceasefire went into effect, this time we are witnessing a "more disciplined" and sophisticated Hamas missile brigade that reportedly has some 15,000 military personnel operating through a network of tunnels.

–          It comes as little surprise then that Hamas has set its own conditions for a truce despite the deadly waves of Israeli air bombardment that have resulted in the death or injury of hundreds of civilians in the densely populated Gaza, described by professor Noam Chomsky on his recent Gaza visit [1] as the world’s largest open-prison. Its inhabitants live in increasingly horrible and uninhabitable conditions as the direct result of Israeli collective punishment of the population ruled by Hamas, which now wants the lifting of the Israeli blockade of the area as a term of truce.

–          There is nothing irrational or outrageous about this demand. It is backed by the international community, which deplores the suffering of civilians in the Gaza Strip.

–          Israel is inherently opposed to anything demanded by Hamas and, therefore, it is more likely now that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will send his tanks into Gaza on a wild goose chase for Hamas’s rocket arsenal. In that case, the war will get messier and the end result muddier, as it did in the 15-day operation in 2009, which ended well short of the stated objective of "destroying Hamas’s infrastructure".

–          If Hamas’s military prowess surprised the Israelis, then its upgraded rocket capability is an even bigger surprise and carries ramifications that do not favor Israel in terms of the regional balance of power. Despite having an "iron dome" shield to intercept, according to reports, roughly 60% of incoming rockets, Israel is today exhibiting an unprecedented vulnerability that is a far cry from the "invincible" Israel proclaimed by its politicians.

– Israel’s goal appears to be a division of Gaza thinly cloaked as a modest war aim, perhaps to cut off Gaza’s link to Egypt as much as possible since it is clear where the rockets come from. This is a big objective, inviting a war of attrition.

–          The fact is that Israel cannot, short of a full-scale and costly invasion and re-occupation of Gaza, fully master its sky from Hamas rockets that now threaten a large portion of the Israeli territory. This is not necessarily a negative development for peace, since Israel’s previous "total domination" was an invitation for the status quo ante, discouraging any serious Israeli move toward comprehensive peace.

–          There is now a new "balance of terror". It is still deeply asymmetrical to Israel’s advantage, yet, since it features the Israeli geostrategic vulnerabilities stated above, the new equation contains a potential plus for a more meaningful bid for peace.

–          Israeli political leaders may be unprepared for this grim new reality, yet their military advisers can shed much light for them on the new reality on the ground; ie, the game-changer is Hamas’s ability to strike deep inside Israel, an ability that is sure to grow even more in the coming years.

–          For now, however, there is a definite lack of fit between the military and political thinking in Israel, and unless the politicians, grudgingly or not, come to terms with it, they may rush their country to the bossom of another war that would be a major drain on the economy (by, for example, depleting the Israeli tourism industry).

–          Now the big question: what will Israel lose and or gain by acceding to Hamas’s demand for lifting the blockade? The answer is determined partly by putting it in specific timeframes. In the long run, a more prosperous Gaza – less agitated by its rampant poverty, malnutrition, and water and other shortages – may be more amenable to maintaining peace in order to secure its prized achievements, than a poor and starving Gaza whose back is against the wall.

–          Unfortunately, many Israeli leaders are immune to an in-depth understanding of interdependence and its political ramifications, convincing themselves instead that they achieve more security by simply relying on brute force to bring their Palestinian opponents to their knees.

–          This "compellence strategy" is fundamentally suspect however, and now in the light of the new "balance of terror" more than ever a product of the past.

Perhaps what Israel needs more than anything else is a post-Zionist enlightened leadership that is not self-imprisoned in the arcane 19th century expansionist ideology and is instead more in tune with the requirements of survival in the contemporary context of globalization and regionalization. That would mean less arrogance and delusion of military superiority, [2] and an admission of vulnerability that can, in turn, create the hitherto absent impetus for understanding and sympathizing with the suffering of the Palestinian "other", who is for now the candidate for mere oppression.

Notes:
1. Impressions of Gaza, November 4, 2012.

2. Israel ranked as most militarized nation, Asia Times Online, Nov 15, 2012.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran’s Foreign Policy (Westview Press). For his Wikipedia entry, click here. He is author of Reading In Iran Foreign Policy After September 11 (BookSurge Publishing , October 23, 2008) and Looking for rights at Harvard. His latest book is UN Management Reform: Selected Articles and Interviews on United Nations, CreateSpace (November 12, 2011).

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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Asia Times      121119

Gaza crisis has more to come

By Victor Kotsev

– On Sunday night, an Egyptian effort to establish a ceasefire between Israel and the Gaza militant factions reportedly collapsed. An Israeli ground invasion of the Gaza Strip loomed, after missiles landed near Tel Aviv for four days in a row – once near Jerusalem, even farther away.

–          Though nobody was hurt in these specific attacks, they came as a slap in the face of the stated goals of the ongoing Israeli operation: stopping the missile fire and restoring deterrence. Rockets had not been aimed at the heart of Israel for over 20 years, since the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles during the First Gulf War. Therefore, as tanks and artillery units rolled toward Gaza and reserve soldiers were reporting for duty (75,000 initially, an increase of more than 40% of the army’s active personnel), a long and bloody operation appeared to be in store, and only an effective miracle of diplomacy could prevent that.

–          Pinning down the beginning of the crisis is almost as difficult as forecasting its end. The Atlantic published an elaborate timeline of its gradual escalation, which involved the targeted assassination of a top Gaza militant, Ahmed al-Jabari, as well as the firing of some 150 rockets into southern Israel during the previous weekend.

–          Other analysts have their own versions: in a report dated November 16, 2012, for example, the influential intelligence-analysis firm Stratfor traced the beginnings of the conflict to the bombing of the Yarmouk weapons factory in Sudan on October 23. According to Stratfor, the Israeli operation, whose English codename is "Pillar of Defense", is first and foremost directed against longer-range missiles supplied by Iran to the Gaza militants; in this account, both Yarmouk and Jabari were key links in that supply chain.

–          Yet there are even deeper causes of the violence, which involve internal Palestinian and Israeli rivalries as well as foreign interests, and which may hamper the efforts to end it. Some analysts ask, for example, if the timing of the escalation right after the US presidential elections was coincidental and whether spoilers might try to ruin any of several major diplomatic initiatives that were expected after Obama’s re-election.

–          Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood president and government are hard-pressed to establish a truce. No less than the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is at stake – Cairo already pulled its ambassador in Tel Aviv "for consultations" – and the Brotherhood is reportedly split between its loyalty for its daughter organization Hamas and its need for external stability in order to focus urgently on its domestic program.

– Rivalry between the main Palestinian factions – Hamas and Fatah – plays an important, if under-reported, role in what is happening.

o   In the past months, the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, headed by President Mahmoud Abbas, suffered a series of setbacks, including the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the recent visit of the Emir of Qatar to the Strip.

–          Other important Middle Eastern leaders, such as the Turkish prime minister, announced plans for similar visits that would boost further the international legitimacy and prestige of the Hamas regime.

–          Abbas planned a grand comeback with his bid for implicit recognition of Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, which was expected to play out later this month. In international legal discourse, for example in the eyes of the International Criminal Court, a vote by the General Assembly would be a sufficient and rather official criterion for statehood. Abbas would achieve the status of a state leader and also win over the Arab masses as a man whose vision for a non-violent resistance produces results. He would acquire new diplomatic levers to use against Israel and would cement his relevance in Middle Eastern politics.

–          All of a sudden, however, it seems that Hamas and Israel took matters in their own hands. Technically, they both took issue with the part of the statehood declaration that specifies the borders of the new Palestinian state.

o   Neither of them was happy with the pre-1967 war lines cited by Abbas, each for its own reasons: Hamas insists on liberating "all of occupied Palestine" while Israel hopes to annex East Jerusalem and its major settlements in the West Bank.

–          In addition, both had an interest in shifting the international focus on themselves. As the left-wing Israeli journalist Amira Hass reported in Ha’aretz, "opponents of Hamas in the Strip say that the escalation suits the political aims of both Hamas and Israel: It dwarfs the importance of the PLO initiative to bring to a vote the Palestinian bid for observer status in the United Nations."

–          Even less known – and still an important contributing factor – is the political battle raging inside Hamas. Internal elections were reportedly scheduled for later this month, and its present chief, Khaled Meshaal, had announced that he would not run.

–          Meshaal, a political rival of the Gaza leadership of Hamas, had embarked on a reconciliation initiative with Abbas last year and had also voiced cautious support for the UN bid (importantly, this put him on the moderate side of Jabari). Now that some of his main opponents are dead and the Strip is in distress, Meshaal may choose to reconsider his retirement.

–          Much more public is the election campaign in Israel, but allegations that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu provoked the clash intentionally in order to gain popularity must be taken with a grain of salt. It is true that in the first few days of the operation, most of the media attention shifted to the prime minister, while his rivals from the opposition rallied behind him. However, he was leading in polls even before the violence, and a prolonged campaign without a clear outcome could destroy this advantage. Most analysts seem to agree that a calm would have been more beneficial to Netanyahu in the run-up to the election.

–          The Israeli leaders’ dilemma can best be summarized as a need to find a response to the continued rocket fire – particularly to the fire on central Israel – that is simultaneously harsh enough to satisfy their primarily right-wing constituency and soft enough not to cause a diplomatic disaster with Egypt and the international community. Netanyahu and his coalition partners would certainly not like to go down in history as the people who let the peace treaty with Egypt collapse – even less so right before the election.

–          Military experts caution that an air war usually becomes less effective after a few days because the air force exhausts most of its target bank. We may be seeing a reflection of that in the increased number of civilian casualties in the last day – 24 died on Sunday, at least 13 of whom were civilians. But while ground war usually increases rather than decreases what the military terms "collateral damage", if the rocket fire from Gaza does not stop and a ceasefire is not established soon, an invasion may become a tactical necessity for the Israeli army.

Amid a decisive push by Cairo to establish a ceasefire and no signs of a let-up in the violence, time may be running dangerously short.

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.

(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

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Asia Times      12119

Netanyahu’s high-stakes game in the Strip

By Ramzy Baroud

–          Many key phrases have been presented to explain Israel’s latest military onslaught against Gaza, which left scores dead and wounded. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is flexing his muscles in preparation for the Israeli general elections in January, suggested some. It is Israel’s way of testing the administration of Egyptian President Mahmoud Morsi, commented others.

–          It was a stern message to Iran, instructed a few.

–          Or that Israel is simply assessing its "deterrence" capabilities. And so on.

–          But there is more than those ready-to-serve analyses. It has been four years since Israel mixed up the cards through an unhindered show of force. Last time it did so was in 2008-09, in a 22-day war it termed "Operation Cast Lead". Then, it killed more than 1,400 Palestinians and wounded over 5,000 others.

–          Excluding Israel’s diehard supporters, the general consensus was, including that of many UN and international rights organizations: Israel committed war crimes and crimes against humanity deserving of international tribunals and due retribution.

–          Of course, none took place. The US government and media stood as an impenetrable shield between Israel’s accused war criminals and those daring to level accusations. Four years later little has changed. Then as it is now, Israel was embarking on national elections, and since "security" is Israel’s enduring strategy whether in national or international politics, it was suddenly realized that Gaza posed a "security threat", thus had to be suppressed or at least taught a lesson.

–          Never mind that a truce was in affect and was mostly holding up, that it was Israel that provoked Palestinian factions to retaliate – before the retaliation was itself considered the original act of aggression as willfully validated by mainstream Western media.

–          In 2008, Barack Obama was elected president, and the outgoing George W Bush administration remained largely "uninvolved", save for the reiteration of Israel’s right to defend itself against hordes of Palestinian terrorists and such. Some then, suggested that Cast Lead was an Israeli trial balloon to test Obama, whom Israel viewed with much suspicion despite all the groveling he has done at Israeli lobby meetings to assure Israel that a president with a middle name such as "Hussein" will not dare demand accountability from Israel.

–          Obama eventually lived up to Israel’s expectations, and despite few hiccups in their relations, the new administration was hardly different from its predecessors. Under Obama, Israel remained a top priority for American diplomacy, politics, military and financial aid and more. However, Israel was still dissatisfied.

–          Political analysts cite a few incidents that made Netanyahu look unfavorably at Obama from the onset. The latter ushered in his foreign policy with the appointment of a Middle East peace envoy and expected Israel to work towards the resumption of the so-called peace process.

–          More dangerously however, Obama spoke bluntly for the need to freeze settlement construction, as a necessary first step before the return to the "negotiations table". Even Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, who understands well the importance of Israeli support for any ambitious US politician, was clear regarding the settlements: President Obama, she said, "wants to see a stop to settlements – not some settlements, not outposts, not natural-growth exceptions".

– Gradually that position weakened, if not entirely reversed. Over the following months and years, the Obama administration retreated to the US’ foreign policy comfort zone regarding Israel: give generously (even in times of economic recession), expect nothing in return, and in the meantime ask no questions. But it takes more to placate an ever-demanding government as that of Netanyahu.

–          The Israeli prime minister is himself troubled by fears that his palpable support of the Republican candidate Mitt Romney, his trademark arrogance and lecturing of Obama regarding Iran could prove costly during Obama’s new term.

–          Not that Obama is likely to be any less enthusiastic about supporting Israel, but the Israeli government is concerned that the US administration might not adopt Israeli foreign policy priorities as if it’s an American doctrine, which has been the case for years.

–          Hours after the election results declared Obama a winner, the Israeli media began censuring the injudiciousness of their prime minister. Articles with such titles as "So Sorry, President Obama, Please Forgive Netanyahu" (Haaretz) and "Bibi Gambled, We’ll Pay" (Yedioth Ahronoth) became commonplace. Romney’s defeat was particularly sobering for Israel since it’s the first time that the power of the Zionist lobby and the endless millions of their patrons, such as multibillionaire gambling magnate Sheldon Adelson were rarely as useful in determining election results of this scale.

–          Truth to be told, Obama is not only unpopular among Israeli political elites, but among the Israeli public as well. "In global polls, Israel is the only country in the world that would have elected Romney over Obama," said ABC, and with a huge margin too.

–          It was early morning on Wednesday November 7 in Israel and the occupied territories when the US election results were declared. The Israeli cabinet swung into action, and the Israel army was quickly deployed to seek provocations at the Gaza border.

–          An earlier incident on November 5, where an apparently mentally unfit man, Ahmad al-Nabaheen was shot dead by Israeli troops, heightened tension, although a truce remained in effect. On November 8, however, Israel sought its casus belli as it moved in on Gaza with tanks and attack helicopters.

o   An early victim was a 12-year-old boy gunned down while playing soccer. Palestinians retaliated, although projectiles inside Israel caused no damage.

o   One Israeli soldier was injured near the border with Gaza and more firing was reported by Palestinian fighters aimed at an Israeli military jeep, injuring four.

o   Two more children were killed in an open soccer field on November 10, prompting more, although still guarded, Palestinian retaliation. Another civilian in Gaza was killed the following day when Israel bombed the funeral tent set up to mourn the victims of past days.

–          On November 12, Egypt was concluding yet another truce between Israel and resistance factions. But that turned out to be a diplomatic embarrassment for Egypt, as the man who agreed to the text of the truce on the Palestinian side, the leader of the Hamas armed resistance in Gaza, Ahmed Jabari, was himself assassinated by an Israeli missile on November 14.

–          No other meaning can be extracted from Jabari’s murder but the fact that Israel had decided to pull the Palestinians into an all-out war.

–          Scores of Palestinians, many of whom civilians, were killed in the subsequent days. Palestinians extended the range of their projectiles into areas near Tel Aviv and as far as Jerusalem. Three Israelis were reportedly killed.

Israel’s obsession with security often, if not always, leads it to create the very conditions that compromise on its own security, so that its leaders may demonstrate the authenticity of their original claim. It is a strange logic that is as old as the state of Israel itself.

–          But the timing of the latest war on Gaza, as in the previous one, partly meant to push the subject of Israel’s security on the top of the new administration’s agenda, rife with crises and challenges. No US administration risks initiating its term in office with an open confrontation with Israel. The conventional wisdom in Washington is that in times of war, Israel is right even if it’s wrong, as it often is. Not even Barack Hussein Obama is strong enough to change that reasoning.

"We strongly condemn the barrage of rocket fire from Gaza into Israel," said Jay Carney, the White House spokesman. "There is no justification for the violence that Hamas and other terrorist organizations are employing against the people of Israel."

–          Now that Israel is once more pushing its agenda as an American priority, the time is ripe for further escalation and for more saber-rattling against Iran, Hezbollah and whomever else Israel perceives as an enemy. Israeli causalities will be used to demonstrate Israel’s supposed vulnerability, and Palestinian deaths will buttress Netanyahu’s rightwing government as Israel’s unbending guardian against those who continue to pose "an existential threat" to the Jewish state. The truth, of course, remains the least relevant.

Ramzy Baroud (ramzybaroud.net) is an internationally syndicated columnist and the editor of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza’s Untold Story.

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